

anarchy

the Polish food riots



no.4 20p



Petit Bourgeois
Anarchists on
Ego Trip.

Anarchy one - Towards A Rational Bisexuality - is now out of print.
 We'd like to reprint two of the articles as a pamphlet, but lack the
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Volume One Number Four Second Series


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
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We waited as long as possible for our blinded sailor-comrades to see with their own eyes where the mutiny lead. But we were confronted with the danger that the ice would melt away and . . . we were compelled to make the attack.

Leon Trotsky, Sochineniya, V.XVII:Bk2,p523

We did not want to shed the blood of our brothers and we did not fire a single shot until compelled to do so. We had to defend the just cause of the laboring people and to shoot—to shoot at our own brothers. . . .

Kronstadt Izvestia, March 8, 1921

*Will red love moan and kill herself?
And downfall grace to save her face?
And history nod to who was right?
And place these corpses in their place?*

*From Potemkin to Kronstadt
The wake of time has rolled
And grey has surfed to green and grey
Fell back again on gull black shoals.*

*The peasants of the Baltic Fleet
Take their slave life in their free hands
There is no bread in Petrograd
No golden sun in that lead land.*

*Across the ice the soldiers come
"Comrades, we are killing you!"
The ice is breaking! and each crack
Rifles us and shivers you.*

*Within the bay the heroes drown
Within the fort the heroes die
Blue beams of longing sweep the sea
Red screams of anguish slit the sky.*



MAKHNO

*History will not speak
Heroes will not lie
Men who wanted love and life
Killed, were killed and died.*

Words: Tuli Kupferberg

class struggles in poland



The background and the struggles of December 1970 and January 1971, by Peter E. Newell. The photo above is a street scene in Szczecin, showing fraternisation between people and troops, 18 Dec. UPI Photo.

POLAND IS IN A MESS. The appalling winter weather did not help. During January coal from the Silesian mines was unable to feed many of the country's power stations because locomotives were freezing to the tracks. In some cities, street lighting had to be cut and shop windows blacked out. Agriculture is stagnant, and there are still shortages of some foodstuffs; whilst certain consumer durables such as TV sets and refrigerators have been over-produced relative to demand. For some time now the country has staggered from one social and economic crisis to another.

Recent industrial unrest, particularly in the North, has resulted in the ousting—for health reasons, so we were told—of Mr. Gomulka, and other changes within the government, ruling bureaucracy and Party. What were the basic causes of the strikes, demonstrations, local insurrections and subsequent political traumas of December, 1970, and the early part of this year? Even to attempt to answer these questions we must discuss—albeit very briefly—the origins of post-war Polish social, economic, and State institutions and structures. First, and most importantly, who runs and controls the Polish State?

THE STRUCTURE OF THE PARTIES

In theory, the State is controlled by the *Sejm* or Parliament, which contains deputies from three political parties: the United Peasant Party, the Democratic Party and the United Workers' Party. The United Peasant Party is merely a sop for the extremely religious and individualistically-minded peasants; the so-called Democratic Party is, presumably, intended for the petit-bourgeois "intellectuals", non-Communist bureaucrats, managers and the like, and small traders and market gardeners, who would never vote for an avowedly Communist or Socialist Party. Leading Churchmen probably vote for "Democratic" candidates. The United Workers' Party is, historically, the result of a "shotgun" marriage between the Polish Socialist Party and the non-purged remnants of the old Communist Party of Poland* who, in the main, returned to Poland under the protection of the invading Red Army after the war. In practice, elections to the *Sejm* are even more of a farce than elections in other countries. One list of candidates is drawn up by the political leadership

*Not to be confused with the new Communist Party of Poland, which is a tiny Maoist group.

of, supposedly, all three parties. There is, however, practically no difference between the policies of the three parties, and absolutely none at all with regard to foreign affairs, relations towards the Soviet Union and Comecon.

In fact, real State power in Poland is in the hands of the leading *cadres* and *apparatchiks* of the United Workers' Party—that is the Communists. Based on the "principles" of democratic centralism, the UWP is a monopolistic organisation. The United Workers' Party, of course, has many hundreds of thousands of ordinary workers as members. A few, particularly in the dim distant past, joined for idealistic reasons; but most joined for the little privileges that accrue to members of a Communist Party that controls a State and economy in an industrially backward country. These hundreds of thousands of members have very little say in running the Party, the State or the economy. All political parties of any consequence are organised from the top downwards. The Polish UWP is no different. For it is not only monopolistic, but also monolithic. Officially at least, all factions, groups and "platforms" are forbidden, despite the ever-recurring struggles for power and occasional purging of oppositionists and scapegoats as we have recently witnessed. Presumably, rank-and-file members can think what they like, but they have no right to organise independently of, or in opposition to, the established leadership. Of course, change and opposition does come, can come, but only from, and within, the ruling strata and leadership, either nationally or locally or both. Mr. Gierek replaces Mr. Gomulka. A "palace" revolution! Until recently, the leadership has been completely independent from control of the membership and, of course, the masses. But, at least, during the last twelve months, it has been increasingly subject to pressures from below, both from rank-and-file members and from non-Party workers, and from that other powerful and very authoritarian organisation, the Catholic Church. Indeed, the Church, even in the worst Stalinist period, proved to be an influential non-Communist pressure group in Poland.

All essential decisions in Poland, therefore, are first made by the UWP leadership. No important decisions are made without the Party. This is what the Communists call the "leading role" of the Party. Outside of the UWP and its satellite parties it is almost impossible for the workers and peasants to organise politically; and outside the Trade Unions—themselves largely Communist "front" organisations subject to Party dictates—it is extremely difficult for them to organise industrially. The virtual prohibition by the ruling Party against independent organising by the workers and peasants (in the Unions, etc.) is guarded and protected by the whole State apparatus of power and coercion: that is, by the political security police, civil militia, army, and the courts and the attorney general's office. Moreover, the Communists have at their disposal the means of production and distribution, as well as the press, radio and TV. Furthermore,

almost all the top managers and government officials are also top, that is influential, members of the United Workers' Party in their own right. This results in the leadership exercising almost absolute power, politically and economically. The Party is the State: the State is the Party.

* * * *

EACH NEW ORDER . . .

Before the last war Poland was primarily an agricultural country and was, economically, very backward. It had a large landlord class and peasantry, and a small proletariat. Much of the small-trading was in the hands of the Jewish population, of whom the majority were extremely poor even by the standards of pre-war Eastern Europe. Politically, Poland under Pilsudsky was to all intents and purposes a Fascist or near-Fascist State. The Communist Party was banned. The majority of the population was—and to some extent still is—devoutly Catholic.

Over twenty-five per cent of pre-war Poland's population were not Polish. They included five million Ukrainians, three million Jews, two million White Russians and almost a million Germans mainly living in the western part of the country. During the fighting in 1939, and throughout the occupation, the Germans exterminated over seven million people; they killed all but a tiny handful of the three million Jews, and following the war, Russian expansion in the east of the country swallowed up all the Ukrainians and White Russians. And, again after the war, the new Polish authorities saw to it that the remaining Germans were "sent packing". Furthermore, under the Nazi "New Order", or *Generalgouvernement*, as Poland was called by the Germans, all Polish schools and universities were closed down, and all independent newspapers, magazines and books banned. Both the land and the working population were exploited for the "glory" of the Third Reich—and the profits of the German bourgeoisie. Most of Poland's small industry was destroyed by the contending German and Red armies, or was in a pretty parlous state by the end of the war. Most of the country's "intelligentsia" had fled or had been killed by the Germans or the Russians. This, then, was the kind of country that the Russian-backed, pro-Stalinist Lublin government found on arrival in Warsaw.

Following the war, Poland was literally moved 125 miles westwards. Vast areas of eastern Poland went to the USSR, whilst Silesia (with its coalfields), the old "free" port of Danzig (Gdansk) and a former part of East Prussia along the Baltic Coast, was ceded to Poland. Ethnically, there were also changes. Poland today is peopled almost exclusively by Poles. There are, however, many thousands of Poles living within the borders of the Soviet Union; and there are some hundreds of thousands of Poles living in Britain, of whom most came from the old aristocracy, "intelligentsia" and landlord classes. These, as many British workers can confirm, continually hark back to

the Poland of pre-war and the political régime of Pilsudsky and Colonel Beck. They are the dubious friends of a "free" Poland, some of whom were witnessed demonstrating in Hyde Park early in 1971.

Poland had to be not only rebuilt anew, but developed industrially if it was to compete with other nations. This was the view of the post-war Stalinist government. The Communists were going to "build socialism". They nationalised the means of production—what was left of them after the Germans had been driven out—transportation, distribution and the banks, by an act of Parliament. The government then pressed ahead with an extensive programme of industrialisation. Although called "building socialism" by the Polish Communists and their Russian masters, Karl Marx would have probably seen it as building capitalism—and a particularly vicious form of State capitalism at that! This was truly Poland's epoch of "primitive accumulation" and the creation of a propertyless, wage-earning class; of the development of wage-labour on the one hand and (State) capital on the other. To some extent, the government was successful in its objective of developing a base of heavy industry in Poland. Like all "communist" societies, however, Polish economic planning was over-centralised. Moreover, the "planned" economy, with its artificially determined prices, bore little relationship to the costs of production. The Communist bureaucrats proved to be hopelessly inefficient. Most were concerned more with keeping their jobs than with improving economic conditions. Polish industry today needs more computers and many more technicians and scientists. Even compared with other East European countries, Poland has got left behind. The workers are not only exploited, but are desperately poor by European standards. Average income of an industrial worker is about 2,400 to 2,500 zlotys a month. Pay in the service industries is considerably less. Yet a 23-inch TV set costs over 12,000 zlotys!

* * * *

DECLINE OF AGRICULTURE . . .

Polish agriculture has not followed the usual Stalinist-communist pattern. Originally, the Polish government's policy was the same as that of all Communist governments—forced collectivisation of the majority of farms, together with a small number of very large State farms employing wage-labour and run by an employed manager or director. However, owing to circumstances which will be mentioned later, the policy of collectivisation was abandoned in 1956. Today, less than five per cent of Polish farms are collectivised, and ten per cent operate as State farms. There are six million peasants working on private farms, and perhaps 400,000 on collective and State farms.

Agriculture in Poland, as elsewhere, has declined relative to industry. In 1937, 63.8 per cent of the population worked on the land; in 1960 it was just under 40 per cent. It is, of course, considerably less today. As in Britain, young farmworkers continually flock into the towns and cities, to work in factories. Much of Polish farming is still horse-powered. Government policy has laid emphasis on mechanisation, but the fragmented nature of landholding

largely precludes this. Machinery such as combine harvesters, designed for large units, have limited impact on farms of a few hectares. Furthermore, Poland has built some of the world's largest fertiliser plants, but again the use of fertilisers is very limited on tiny farms. But grain production on the State farms has increased enormously through mechanisation and the use of fertilisers. All the same, in order to maintain meat exports (mainly to Britain), Poland still has to import grain from abroad in large quantities. Unfortunately for the workers and peasants—and the government—bad floods in the winter of 1969/70, followed by a dry summer, resulted in a poor harvest. Food sold to the State earned little for the peasants.

. . . RISE OF THE MILLIONAIRE

Within the non-collectivised farm sector, there are considerable differences in the size, and prosperity, of the individual farms, smallholdings and market gardens. Indeed, 44.6% of farms are three hectares (2.471 acres = 1 hectare) or less; 28.9% are 3-7 hectares; 12.7% are 7-10 hectares; 7.9% are 10-15 hectares and 2.8% are 15 hectares or over. Some farmers and market gardeners, however, are extremely wealthy, not only by Polish standards, but by Western standards as well. There are about 500 zloty millionaires* amongst Poland's big market gardeners. Of one of them in particular, the *Financial Times* (3.10.70) said the following: "Wealth here shows itself in tight bundles of 500 zloty notes, town houses, seaside villas, expensive Western cars, lavish parties, and other more blatant manifestations which from time to time draw bursts of criticism from the official press. Friends of Pani Barbara estimate that she spends more in one month on massage and beauty treatment than a computer programmer earns in the same period". Obviously a capitalist by anyone's criteria! About 3% of Poland's farms use hired labour.

If forced collectivisation is no longer operative in Poland, how then does the State control the majority of the peasants and farmers? How is their personal (individual and family) consumption limited and controlled? These questions have been dealt with in considerable detail by Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski in their *Open Letter to the Party*, published in 1965. The following paragraph follows their analysis fairly closely.

The major limiting factor on peasant consumption is direct fiscal pressure—that is taxes and compulsory deliveries. True, compulsory deliveries are paid for by the State, but the rates are, on average, half those obtained on the "free" market. Secondly, the pressure exerted through the State monopoly of the market. The State is the sole supplier of all other commodities that the peasant farm acquires on the market. Furthermore, the present system of draining away surpluses deprives the countryside of a material base for the further expansion of its own productive potential. Hence, the stagnation of agricultural production with a simultaneous, and fairly rapid, growth of production resources in industry. Nice new refrigerators, and

*One million zlotys are worth about £17,000.

bugger-all to put in them! This phenomenon is common to all industrialised (or partially-industrialised) "communist" countries ruled by bureaucratic State Capitalist dictatorships.

* * * *

1956—THE CREATION OF WORKERS' COUNCILS

The year 1956 was a bad one for the Communist rulers of Eastern Europe. In that year there had been risings in Hungary, East Germany, Bulgaria, the USSR—and Poland. This is not the place to record the heroic struggles of the Hungarian workers, the street battles between students and units of the Red Army in Kiev, in the Ukraine, or the scores of arrests of anarchists in Sofia, in Bulgaria. Brief mention, however, must be made of events in Poland.

The Polish revolt, like the East German, began with a strike of industrial workers. But unlike the Berlin revolt it was much better organised. In Poznan, on July 28, the workers of the big ZISPO locomotive works marched out and on to Red Army Street in the centre of the city. There were 15,000 on the march. Within minutes, workers, shouting such slogans as "Bread and Freedom", left the factories and building sites throughout the city. All traffic was forced to a standstill. Students and housewives then joined the demonstration, and marched on the local police station and jail. The prisoners were released. The UWP headquarters was ransacked, and the security police (UB) attacked with captured rifles. The radio station was seized and used by the workers to broadcast their views. The headquarters of the UB was not captured, and after heavy fighting the Communists—with the support of the Red Army—regained control. But that was not the end of the struggle. The Poznan events were only the dramatic manifestations of a longer and more deep-seated struggle within Polish society, between the workers and the State bureaucracy. Poznan resulted in the ousting of the arch-Stalinist, Edward Ochab, the rehabilitation of the formerly disgraced, and jailed, Gomulka, and his elevation to the position of First Secretary of the United Workers' Party. Poznan also gave rise to the so-called October Left, and the creation of Workers' Councils and the Workers' Councils' movement.

During the early days of the revolt, the Workers' Councils were, to some extent, autonomous organisations of the workers' struggles. They had a certain amount of local power and influence in the factories. Moreover, the new "liberal" government accepted the formation of Workers' Councils as a *fait accompli*. The so-called October Left within the Party looked upon the Workers' Councils as the basis of a new social relationship and the nucleus of a kind of dual political power in the country. They did not, however, have any clear understanding of what these Councils should do, or be; the October Left was unable to put forward any alternative to the system of bureaucratic State capitalism—except to attack bureaucracy in general terms and give support to the new "liberal" government and bureaucracy! In this way, as Kuron and Modzelewski (themselves libertarian "Trotskyists") admitted, the Left contributed to maintaining the power of the bureaucracy,

and in essence signed its own death warrant. Moreover, as they also point out, the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee of the United Workers' Party resulted in a victory for the "liberal" wing of the bureaucracy, whose aim was in fact the stabilising of the existing system by internal reforms. A leadership was elected which, at the time at least, enjoyed considerable popularity not only within the Party, but also in the country at large. Giving up forced collectivisation met the demands of the whole country: it also benefited the *Kulaks*, the capitalist farmers and market gardeners, which has already been mentioned. The government raised the salaries of the managers and directors of factories. The workers were not given wage increases, but won them some time later through militant pressure.

Once the new "liberal" government had "found its feet", it naturally began to behave just like any other government. It was not interested in freedom, a free society, or even genuine communism. The government and the Party leadership began to govern. In the spring of 1957, the leadership of the UWP was able to begin the restoration of the monolithic "unity" of the Party; it also condemned the expansion of Workers' Councils, and the calling of a national congress of councils, as an "anarchist utopia". And by the autumn of that year, the government had the upper hand. A strike of streetcar workers in Lodz was crushed by the militia and political security police. Demonstrations were dispersed in Warsaw in October, and by the spring of the following year the Workers' Councils were virtually moribund, having been taken over by the Party and its Trade Union apparatus. Despite all this, the workers and peasants of Poland did achieve something. Living standards did improve quite considerably for some years. The 1956 revolt was not all lost.

* * * *

"FREE" FREE, AND THE COST OF LIFE

Compared with the 1919-39 period, the 1945-65 period was characterised as one of rising living standards generally. However, as Andrzej Karpinski admits in his *Twenty Years of Poland's Economic Development*, living standards in Poland during this period were not brought up to the levels of the economically front-running countries of the world. In the countries of Western Europe, he says, the bulk of family needs are financed by the individual earnings of the employee. By contrast in Poland, there is a broad range of consumption, in some cases as high as 30 to 40 per cent of total family requirements, which are satisfied by services provided "free" by the State, or with the people paying only a nominal charge. There is completely free education at all levels, free medical care, holidays organised and financed, to a large extent, by the State and extremely low rents.

Average monthly wages (excluding family allowances) amounted to approximately 1,800 zlotys in 1962, whilst top wages rose to about 5,000 zlotys. From 1955 to 1963, the average real wage in Poland rose by more than thirty-five per cent, though real wages—that is living standards—levelled out to some extent after 1964. The real income of the peasantry, according to Karpinski, rose somewhat more quickly over the



same period.

The twenty-year period up to 1965, brought a marked increase in the consumption of manufactured goods in Poland. This was particularly noticeable with regard to consumer durables, especially during the ten years from 1953 to 1963. Prior to 1953, the emphasis had been on the construction of heavy industry. According to Karpinski, the production of radios increased from 268,000 in 1953 to 487,000 in 1963; telephones from 112,000 to 285,000; motorcycles from a mere 13,700 to 150,000; bicycles from 131,000 to 663,000; washing machines from 300 to 537,000; refrigerators from 400 to 120,000 . . . and so on. Cameras, scooters, mopeds, wrist watches and TV sets were not manufactured at all in Poland in 1953. Yet ten years later almost 370,000 TV sets were made in one year! In recent years, sales of some of these durables per 1,000 of the population were not much below those of Western Europe, and considerably more than in the Soviet Union. As a result, over 3,500,000 Polish women owned washing machines and more than 1,100,000 families had TV sets by about 1966. On the other hand, automobile ownership has remained extremely low by European and American standards. Poland does not produce them,* mainly because it has no oil wells, and the importation of much oil or petrol would put an excessive burden on her rather shaky balance of payments.

The period 1945 up to about 1965 or so, then, was a period of general increasing living standards in Poland. The increases started very slowly and were not uniform. After 1965, there was a certain levelling out. At the same time, however, Polish living standards were, as has already been noted, low by European standards generally.

The level of nutrition and food consumption also rose during the first twenty years following the war, despite the backwardness and fragmented nature of Polish agriculture. Indeed, meat consumption in Poland around 1966 or 1967 amounted to almost 50 kg. a

year compared with 17 kg. in 1939. "The considerable increase in food consumption in Poland, despite the slow and clearly inadequate development of agriculture in this period," says Andrzej Karpinski, "was made possible by the big restrictions on the exports of some farm products such as grain or livestock for slaughter. In actual fact, before the war these exports were of a hunger type, for consumption in the inter-war Poland was maintained at a low level." After the war, on the other hand, Poland became a major importer of certain farm products, especially those used for fodder. Thus, there was a fundamental change in the balance of foreign trade in agricultural produce which made possible more profound improvements in raising living standards than would from the development of the country's agriculture. However, during the last five years, the position has been largely reversed again, with Poland exporting foodstuffs—such as meat products—which Polish workers and peasants would welcome at home.

Housing construction also increased considerably after the war. Though on a fairly large scale when compared to the national income, such construction has been on a much smaller scale *per capita* than in Western Europe. Moreover, after 1959, the growth of housing construction was held back. Furthermore, as Karpinski has admitted, "Housing construction in Poland during this period could not cope with the massive influx of rural inhabitants into the towns and the high birth rate. A shortcoming of housing construction in Poland is that it is finished more poorly than in developed countries." Together with the problems of stagnation in agriculture (giving rise to certain food shortages), the acute housing problem has exacerbated the tensions and conflicts in Poland in recent years.

* * * *

PURGES AND POGROMS

Over the last five or six years there has been increasing tension, and growing contradictions, between the top UWP leadership and bureaucracy on the one

*They now assemble Fiat cars in Warsaw. They sell at 180,000 zlotys each.

hand and the workers, peasants and "intellectuals" on the other. This first manifested itself in 1964—and was, at that time, largely political. Partly inside the Party and partly outside, opposition came mainly from "Left Communist" and "Trotskyist" students, post-graduate students and University lecturers.

In 1965, a group was arrested at Warsaw University on a charge of "hoarding and distributing anti-government literature". Among the group were Ludwig Hass, a veteran Polish Trotskyist who, when the Red Army invaded Poland in 1939, was taken to Russia by the NKVD and imprisoned in a concentration camp at Vorkuta until 1957, when he was finally released and allowed to return to Poland; Kazimierz Radowski, an economics lecturer; Roald Smiech, a young history lecturer; Karol Modzelewski, whose father had been foreign minister during the Stalinist administration, between 1947 and 1951, and his friend Jacek Kuron. Previously, in 1964, Kuron and Modzelewski had organised a meeting in support of a letter written by thirty-four lecturers against censorship and the lack of freedom in Poland. They also wrote a short manuscript criticising the Party and the bureaucracy. For this they were harassed by the political security police, had their document confiscated, imprisoned for two days and were then expelled from the United Workers' Party in November. Later, the authors after re-writing and considerably expanding their *Open Letter*, were rearrested and brought, in chains, to trial in July, 1965. In court, they defended what they had written; and when the Judge sentenced Kuron to three years and Modzelewski to three-and-a-half years in jail, workers, students and lecturers outside the court sang the *Internationale*. At his trial, Ludwig Hass—who had suffered under the pre-war régime of Pilsudsky and had spent eighteen years in Vorkuta—received three years. Radowski and Smiech were also imprisoned for three years. Hass told his judges: "You are destroying Communists just like Stalin did."

March, 1968, saw students, largely inspired by the events in Prague, demonstrating in the streets of Cracow and Warsaw. The over-reaction of the ORMO or so-called Workers' Militia increased the violence. The three days of rioting in Warsaw was actually sparked off by the expulsion from Warsaw University of two dissident students, Adam Michnik and Henryk Szlajfer. The demonstrations were followed by two weeks of sit-ins. The Warsaw First Secretary of the UWP alleged that the instigators of the demonstrations were two "bankrupt" politicians who had been demoted for their "excessive" liberalism. The students also protested against the "anti-Zionist" campaign, which was in fact an anti-Jewish and anti-intellectual campaign. Indeed, the government blamed the upheavals on "the Zionists", and there followed a pogrom against the 25,000 remaining Jews in Poland. Soon after about half of them fled the country. A victim of the purge, Zygmund Bauman, declared that the anti-Jewish campaign—which was "inspired from above"—must be seen as an "internecine political struggle which has nothing in common with any Jewish problems". Once again, many opponents of the régime were arrested. Among them were the two students, Michnik and Szlajfer, and Kuron and Modzelewski, who had been released from prison before completing their full

sentences. Kuron and Modzelewski went on trial on January 3, 1969. They were accused of forming an organisation for the purpose of starting demonstrations, of having organised the demonstrations in March, 1968, and of receiving a duplicator from the Secretariat of the Fourth International in Brussels. Once again, they returned to jail. On February 8, Michnik and Szlajfer, together with Babara Torunczyk and Victor Gorecki, were accused of taking part in "illegal actions", and with transmitting information to the Fourth International. The second charge, however, was dropped, but Michnik was sentenced to three years, Szlajfer and Torunczyk to two years and Gorecki to twenty months in jail. Others who had criticised the government, its cultural policies and activities, were publicly abused in the official Party press, expelled from the Party and banned from writing publicly.

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
WORK HARDER, PAY MORE

Ordinary working-class discontent had been building up for more than a year before the December, 1970, upheavals. Foreign correspondents had been reporting that the Polish economy appeared to be on the point of collapse throughout the year.

The "conservative" Stalinists had been forced to allow the "progressive" economists to prepare plans for limited reforms of the rigid centralised economy. Indeed, a few State enterprises had already been selected in 1969 to test out a new wages policy and production incentive plan. Few workers understood how they worked, however, and there was considerable discontent, small-scale spontaneous strikes and protests. Some workers, however, secured temporary adjustments. Fuel costs rose throughout the year; and the government announced that rents (relatively low it is true) would be doubled by January, 1971. The government also raised the pay of the army, the civil militia and the security police—in anticipation of trouble, no doubt! Throughout the summer months, unemployment remained at over 200,000.

During the summer of 1970, the UWP leadership received many confidential reports of food shortages. Workers demonstrated in the Silesian city of Katowice. Coalminers staged below-ground sit-ins until promised increased meat rations. Work-stoppages also occurred at the Polski-Fiat works, and at the Rosa Luxemburg lamp factory in Warsaw. The government, therefore, delayed announcing food price rises. At the end of November, Mr. Gomulka visited Zabrze in Silesia, and in a speech to miners foreshadowed the increases. He dwelt at great length on the meat problem. There had been a "deterioration in market supplies of meat", he admitted. The difficulties were, he said "acute". They were less than the Plan target by over 50%. This was because of export commitments and payment obligations vis-à-vis Britain and other "capitalist countries". The measures that the government had taken to improve the situation, he continued, would only become effective after a time. In the meantime, demand had to be balanced with supply, said Mr. Gomulka. In Zabrze, they may have been warned—

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THE ANARCHIST REVOLUTION



Nestor Makhno

I

ANARCHISM—a life of freedom and creative independence for humanity.

Anarchism does not depend on theory or on programmes which try to grasp man's life in its entirety. It is a teaching which is based on real life, which outgrows all artificial limitations, which cannot be constricted by any system.

Anarchism's outward form is a free, non-governed society which offers freedom, equality and solidarity for its members. Its foundations are to be found in man's sense of mutual responsibility which has remained unchanged in all places and at all times. This sense

of responsibility is capable of securing freedom and social justice for all men by its own unaided efforts. It is also the foundation of true communism.

Anarchism therefore is a part of human nature, communism its logical extension.

This led to the necessity of formulating anarchism's basic theories by the use of factual material and by systematised analysis. Some people (enemies of freedom, enemies of equality and of solidarity), were to try and conceal anarchism's truths or to slander its ideals; others (fighters for man's right to lead a proper life) were to develop and clarify this ideal. I think that Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin, Most, Kropotkin,

Malatesta, S. Faure and others never believed, and still do not believe, that they could harness anarchism to a framework of immutable scientific dogma by their theories. Instead, the teachings of anarchism represent a concerted effort to show its roots in human nature, and to prove that man's creative achievements never deviate from it; anarchism's fundamental trait, the negation of all bondage and servitude, is likewise to be found in human nature.

Anarchism means freedom; socialism cannot destroy chains or bondage.

I am an anarchist and a revolutionary myself, and I took part in the activities of the revolutionary peoples of the Ukraine. The Ukrainians are a people who grasp instinctively the meaning of anarchist ideas and who act them out. They suffered incredible hardship, but have never ceased to talk of their freedom and freedom for their form of life. I often made tactical errors on this difficult path as I was often weak and unable to make judgements. But because I correctly understood the goal towards which I and my brothers were working, I was able to observe the effect of living anarchism during the struggle for freedom and independence. I remain convinced on the grounds of my practical fighting experience that anarchism is as revolutionary, as diverse and as sublime in every facet as is human life itself. Even if I only felt the remotest glimmer of sympathy for anarcho-revolutionary activity I would still call on you, reader and brother, to take up the struggle for the ideal of anarchism, for only if you fight for this ideal and uphold it will you understand it properly. Anarchism has grown out of human nature, and grows organically, for while it frees man from psychological bondage it turns him also into a conscious fighter against slavery. Anarchism is revolutionary in this and in many other aspects. The more awake a man is, the deeper his thoughts about his situation are. He will recognise his state of slavery and the anarchistic and revolutionary spirit within him will awake and show itself in his thoughts and actions. It is the same for every man and woman, even if they know nothing of the word anarchism, even if they could never have heard of it.

Anarchism plays a considerable role in the enrichment of human life, a fact recognised by the oppressors as well by the oppressed. The oppressors do their best to distort the ideal of anarchism, the others do their best to carry it further. Modern civilisation has succeeded in making anarchism ever more prominent for both masters and slaves, but has never been able to lull or to extinguish this fundamental protest of human nature, for it has been unable to stamp out the independent intellects who proved that God does not exist. Once this had been proven it was easy to draw back the veil which hides the artificiality of the priesthood and the hierarchies which it supports.

But various other ideas have been propounded alongside anarchism: "liberalism", socialism and bolshevik communism. These doctrines, despite their large influence on modern society, despite their triumph over both reaction and freedom, are on shaky ground because of their artificiality, their disavowal of organic development and their tendency towards paralysis.

The free man, on the other hand, has thrown away the trammels of the past together with its lies and

brutality. He has buried the rotten corpse of slavery and notion that the past is better. Man has already partially liberated himself from the fog of lies and brutality which enslaved him from the day of his birth, from the worship of the bayonet, money, legality and hypocritical science.

While man frees himself from this insult he understands himself better, and once he has understood himself, the book of his life is opened to him. In it he immediately sees that his former life was nothing but loathsome slavery and that this framework of slavery has conspired to stifle all his innate good qualities. He sees that this life has turned him into a beast of burden, a slave for some or a master over others, or into a fool who tears down and tramples on all that is noble in man when ordered to do so. But when freedom awakes in man, it treads all artificialities into the dust and all that stands in the way of independent creativity.

This is how man moves in his process of development. In former times he moved in spans of a generation or so, but now the process is moving year by year; man does not wish to be an academic mouthpiece of the rule over others or to tolerate the rule of others over himself. Once man is free from earthly and "heavenly" Gods, free from "good manners" and from "morality" which depend on these Gods, he lifts up his voice and struggles against the enslavement of mankind and the distortion of his nature.

This man of protest, who has fully grasped his identity and who now sees with his eyes fully open, who now thirsts for freedom and totality, now creates groups of free men welded together by the ideal and by action. Whoever comes into contact with these groups will cast off his status of lackey and will free himself from the idiot domination of others over him. Any ordinary man who comes from the plough, the factory, the bench of the university or from the desk of the academic, will recognise the degradation of slavery. As man uncovers his true personality, he will throw away all artificial ideas which go against the rights of his personality, the Master/Slave relationship of modern society. As soon as man brings to the fore the pure elements in his personality through which a new, free human community is born, he will become a conscious anarchist and revolutionary. This is how the ideal of anarchism is assimilated and disseminated by man: the free man recognises its deep truth, its clarity and its purity, its message of freedom and creativity.

The idea of anarchism, the teaching of a renewed life for man as an individual and as a social being, is therefore bound up with man's self-awareness and his awareness of the suppurating sore of injustice in modern society. Anarchism exists therefore only illegally or semi-legally. Never in total legality.

In the modern world, society does not live for itself but for the preservation of the Master/Slave relationship, the State. One could go further and say that society has completely de-personalized itself. In human terms, it does not exist at all. It is widely believed however that the State is Society. But is "Society" a group of men who live it up while sitting on the shoulders of all humanity? Why is man as an individual or as a mass numbering hundreds of millions nothing in comparison with this slothful group of "political

leaders"? These hyenas, rulers both of right and left wing, are rightly upset with the idea of anarchism. The bourgeois at least are frank about this. But the State-socialists of all denominations, including the bolsheviks, are busy swapping the names of bourgeois rule with those of their own invention, while leaving its structure essentially unchanged. They are therefore trying to salvage the Master/Slave relationship with all its contradictions. And although they are aware that these contradictions are totally irreconcilable with their professed ideals, they nevertheless uphold them in order to forestall the putting into practice of Anarchist Communism. In their programmes, the State-socialists said that man must be allowed to free himself "socially". But of man's spiritual freedom, of his human freedom, no word was spoken. Instead, they are now making sure that such a liberation of man outside their tutelage cannot be carried through. "Liberation" under the management of any government or political set-up—what's that got to do with freedom? The bourgeois, who never applies himself to the task of making anything beautiful or useful, says to the worker: "Once a slave, always a slave. We cannot reform social life because we've got too much capital in industry and in agriculture. Besides, modern life is pleasant for us; all the kings, presidents and their governments cater for our wishes and bow before us. The slaves are their responsibility." Or he says: "The life of our modern society is full of great promise!"

"No, no!" scream the bourgeois socialists and communists. "We disagree!" Then they rush to the workers, marshal them into parties, and call on them to rebel as follows:

"Drive out the bourgeois from their positions and hand their power over to us. We will work for you. We will liberate you."

So the workers, whose hatred of government is even greater than their hatred of parasites, rise up in revolution to destroy the machinery of power and its representatives. But either because of clumsiness or naivety, they allow socialism to come to power. This is how the communists got into power in Russia. These communists are the real dregs of mankind. They tear down and shoot innocent people and hang liberty; they shoot men exactly as the bourgeois did. They shoot men who think differently to them in order to subjugate all to their power, in order to throttle the spirit of freedom and creativity in mankind, in order to enslave him to the throne of government they have just taken over. They hire guards for themselves and killers for dealing with free men. Under the weight of the chains made by the new "Workers' Republic" in Russia, man groans and sighs as he did under bourgeois rule. Elsewhere, man is groaning under the yoke of the bourgeoisie or under that bourgeois socialists. The hangmen, both old and new, are strong. Their methods of keeping power are efficient. They have mastered the art of tactical suppression of opposition, and man only flares up briefly to contest his rights before sinking down again under the burden of authority and despair. He drops his hands as the noose is thrown around his neck again, shutting his eyes like a slave before the gleeful hangman.

From these unfolding vistas of human misery and from personal misery, man must forge convictions, call

other men his brothers, and fight for freedom. Man is only free if he is prepared to kill every hangman and every power magnate if they do not wish to stop their shameful tasks. He is only free if he does not put a prime on changing his government and is not led astray by the "Workers' Republic" of the bolsheviks. He must vouch for the establishment of a truly free society based on personal responsibility, the only really free society. His pronouncement on the State must be one of total destruction:

"No. This must not be. To rebellion! Rise up, brothers, against all government, destroy the power of the bourgeoisie and do not allow the socialists and bolshevik government to come to life! Destroy all authority and drive out its representatives!"

There are even moments when the authority of the socialists and communists is worse than the bourgeois, for they tear down their own ideas and trample on them. After fumbling about in secret for the keys to bourgeois government, the communists become guilty and furtive; they do not want the masses to see what they are doing, so they lie and cheat and deceive. If the masses notice this, they seethe with indignation. So the government falls upon them in an orgy of irresponsibility and butchers them in the name of "socialism" and "communism". The government has of course long since thrown these ideas into the dustbin. At such moments the rule of the socialists and bolsheviks is more degraded than that of the bourgeoisie for it is even unoriginal in its recourse to the mechanics of bourgeois oppression. While a bourgeois government will string a revolutionary up on the gallows, socialist or bolshevik-communist governments will creep up and strangle him in his sleep or kill him by trickery. Both acts are depraved. But the socialists are more depraved because of their methods.

Any political revolution in which the bourgeoisie, the socialists and state-communists struggle with each other for political ascendancy while dragging in the masses will show the traits outlined above, the most obvious example being the Russian Revolutions of February and October 1917. When the working masses which made up Tsarist Russia felt themselves partially freed from reaction, they began to work towards total freedom. They expressed this wish by expropriating landlords and monasteries and by handing over their lands to the people who wished to cultivate it without hired labour. Sometimes factories, works, presses and other businesses were taken over by those who worked in them. Attempts were made to create liaisons between towns and villages. And while they were engaged in this activity the people were of course unaware that there were governments sitting about in Kiev, Khar'kov, St. Petersburg and elsewhere. The people were in fact laying the foundations for a new, free society which should throw out all parasites and governments and the idiocy of power. This healthy activity was especially noticeable in the Urals, in Siberia and in the Ukraine. It was remarked upon by the old as well as the new regimes in Petrograd, Moscow, Kiev and Tiflis. But the socialists as well as the bolsheviks had (and still have) a widely dispersed party membership and a well-distributed network of professional killers. It must be added that besides these professional killers they also hired people from our own ranks. With the

help of these people they managed to nip the people's freedom in the bud. And they did a good job. The Spanish Inquisition would have gone green with envy.

We now know the real truths behind government. To the bolsheviks and socialists we say: "Shame! Dishonour! You talked such a lot about the terror of the bourgeoisie and you took the side of revolution with great zeal. But now you're in power you show yourselves the same old fools, the same lackeys of the bourgeoisie and slaves of their methods. You've turned yourselves into bourgeois." Looking at the experiences of bolshevist communism during recent years, the bourgeois know perfectly well that this particular brand of socialism can never manage without using their methods or without hiring them in person. It knows that the exploitation and suppression of the



working majority is inherent in this system, that the vicious life of sloth is not cast aside in socialism but that it merely masquerades under another name before spreading and taking root again.

This is the Truth! You've only got to look at the bolshevik vandals and their monopoly over the people's revolutionary conquests! Look at their spies, their police, their laws, prisons, jailors and their armies of bailiffs. The "Red" Army is only the old army under a new name.

Liberalism, socialism, bolshevism. They are three brothers who go their different ways to grab power over man. This power is used to block man's advance towards self-realization and independence.

TO REBELLION!

This is the cry of the anarchist-revolutionary to the exploited. Rebel, destroy all government and see that it never takes root again. Power is used by those who have never really lived by the work of their hands. Government power will never let workers tread the road to freedom; it is the instrument of the lazy who want to dominate others, and it does not matter if power is in the hands of the bourgeois, the socialists or the bolsheviks, it remains degrading. There is no government without teeth, teeth to tear any man who longs for a free and just life.

Brother: drive out power in yourself. Never let it fascinate you or your brothers. A true collective life is not built with programmes or with governments but with the freedom of mankind, with his creativity and his independence.

The freedom of any individual carries within it the seed of a free and complete community without government, a free society which lives in organic and decentralized totality, united in its pursuit of the great human goal: Anarchist Communism!

II

Anarchistic Communism is a great community in total harmony. It is formed voluntarily by free individuals who form associations and federations according to their needs.

Anarchistic Communism fights to secure man's freedom and his right to boundless development, it fights against all the evils and injustices which are inherent in governments.

The free, non-governed society aims to embellish life with its intellectual and manual work. It will have as its resources all that nature gave to man as well as nature's own inexhaustible riches; it makes man drunk with the beauty of the earth and exhilarated by his own, self-made freedom. Anarchist Communism will let man develop his creative independence in all directions; its adherents will be free and happy with life, guided by brotherly work and reciprocity. They will need no prisons, hangmen, spies or agents, which are products of the bourgeoisie and socialists, for they will have no need of the idiot robber and murderer which is the State. Prepare yourselves, brothers, to create this society! Prepare organisations and ideas! Remember that your organisations must be safe from attack. The enemy of your freedom is the State, personified in five figures:

- (1) The property owner.
- (2) The lover of war.
- (3) The judge.
- (4) The priest.
- (5) Academics who distort the truth about man.

These last make up "Historical Laws" and "Judiciary Norms", and scribble slickly in order to get money; they are busy all the time trying to prove the rightfulness of the first four's claims to power which degrades human life.

The enemy is strong. For millenia he has spent his time accumulating experience in robbery, violence, expropriation and murder. He underwent an inner crisis and is now busy changing his outward aspect, but he is only doing this because his life has been threatened with the new, emerging knowledge. This new knowledge is waking man up from his long sleep, freeing him from prejudices implanted by the five, giving him a weapon to fight for his true society. This change in the outer appearance of our enemy can be seen in reformism. It was evolved to combat the revolution in which we took part. In the Russian Revolution the "five" seemed to have vanished off the face of the earth . . . but this was only appearance. In reality our enemy changed his features momentarily

and is now calling up new recruits to fight against us. Bolshevik communism is especially revealing in this matter; but it will be a long time before this doctrine will forget man's struggle for true freedom.

The only reliable method for waging a successful struggle against enslavement is social revolution which engages the masses in a continual struggle (evolution). When it first erupts, social revolution is elemental. It flattens the path for its own organization while smashing any dam which is artificially set against it. These dams in fact only increase its power. Anarchist revolutionaries are already working for this, and any man who is aware of the burden of slavery on himself has a duty to aid the anarchist; at the same time every man should feel responsible to the whole of mankind when he struggles against the five of the State. Every man should also remember that the social revolution will require appropriate methods of realization; this is especially true of the anarchist who is scouting ahead along the road to freedom. During the destructive phase of revolution, while slavery is being abolished and freedom beginning to spread in an elemental outburst, organisation and steadfast methods are essential to secure the gains. In this phase the revolution needs you most urgently. The Russian Revolution, in which anarchists played a considerable role (which they could not carry through because action was denied to them), brought home to us the truth that the masses who have torn themselves loose from their chains had no desire to put on others of a different make. In their revolutionary momentum, they sought immediately for free associations which would not only aid their efforts to build up a new community but which would defend them against the enemy. If we look at this process closely we come to the conclusion that the best method to create new collective freedom is the **Free Soviet**. Proceeding from this conviction, the anarchist revolutionary will call the enslaved to struggle for these free associations. He will believe that social revolution will thus create freedom while smashing slavery



NESTOR MAKHNO.

altogether. This belief must be cherished and defended. The only people who can possibly provide the defence for this belief are the masses themselves who have made the revolution and who equate their lives with their principles. While the human masses create the revolution they instinctively cast about for free associations and rely on their inherent anarchism: they will uphold above all the Free Soviet. As the masses make a revolution they are bound to come upon this themselves and the anarchist must help them formulate this principle.

Economic problems in the free society will be resolved by the producer-consumer co-operatives in which the Free Soviets will act as co-ordinators and clarifiers. The nature of the Free Soviet during the social revolution must be to consolidate the masses' position by urging them to take their rightful inheritance (land, factories, works, mineral and coal mines, shipping, forestry, etc.) into their own hands. While groups according to interest or inclination are formed, the masses will build up an entire social fabric, freely and independently.

The struggle along this road will demand great sacrifice, for it will be the final effort of nearly-free man. In this struggle there will be no hesitation, no sentimentality. Life or Death!?—this question will stand before every man who considers his rights and those of humanity to a better life. As the healthy instincts of man will have preponderance, he will embark upon this road to life as the victor and creator.

Organise yourselves, brothers, call every man to your ranks. Call him from the factory, from the school, call the students and the learned. It may be that nine out of ten academics will not come to you, or it may happen that they will come in order to deceive you if they are servants of the State five. But the tenth man will come. He will be your friend and will help you overcome the deceit of the others. Organize yourselves, call every man to your ranks, call on all the governors to stop their stupidity and the brutalizing of human life. If they do not desist, disarm the police, the army and other organisations of the five's defence. Burn their laws and destroy their prisons, kill the hangmen, the bane of mankind. **SMASH AUTHORITY.** Call to your ranks the press-ganged army; there are many killers in the army who are against you and who are bribed to kill you. But there are friends for you, even in the army; they will confound the mobs of murderers and will hurry to your side.

After we have collected ourselves into a great, universal family, brothers, we will go further in the fight against darkness. On to the universal human ideal! We will live as brothers, enslaving no one. The brute force of the enemy will be answered with force by our revolutionary army. If our enemies do not agree with our ideals, we will reply by building our new life based on individual responsibility. Only hardened criminals who belong to the five will not wish to tread the road to a new life with fruitful activity. They will try to fight us in order to regain their power. They must die.

Long live the ideal of universal human harmony and man's fight towards it! Long live the ideal of anarchist society!

(Translated by Mike Jones.)

American Conservative Anarchism

Kingsley Widmer

NEW REFORMATION: NOTES OF A NEOLITHIC CONSERVATIVE by Paul Goodman. (U.S.A.: Random House, \$5.95.)

READING YET ANOTHER of Paul Goodman's books becomes an exasperated wash of admiration and irritation. Let me summarize a few of his merits first. As the best known American anarchist, Goodman serves as an almost indispensable intellectual detergent in the muddy scenes of the political ideologues. His distinctive libertarian voice lightens all sorts of things. While the rightists are right that there's a lot of anarchism around these days—it is a recurrent curse word with such vicious characters as Vice-President Agnew who, of course, confuses it with the chaos he helps engender—anarchism's singing brightness doesn't get much seen and heard. Unlike some other countries, America has little in the way of *recognized* anarchism—no long continuing group, no sustained quality publications, no press, and little self-conscious anarchist tradition, in spite of a varied libertarian heritage and a considerable number of such radicals. (In each of the half dozen universities in which I have taught, I've soon found another avowed anarchist—usually a Professor of English or History or Philosophy, sometimes more academically marginal fields, but never in the political or social-racketeering sciences—and one can safely bet that there are hundreds of them.) As with so many things American, its anarchism, too, is fragmented, amorphous, often oddly combined with other views or almost perversely obscured. But that is part of the confusion which also makes America bearable.

Paul Goodman, then, is especially important in his role as self-identified anarchist and as a public spokesman for many traditional anarchist responses. This includes not just anti-statism and anti-bureaucracy but positive decentralization of power and more direct democracy at work and school and play. Indeed, Goodman is at least temperamentally distinguishable from other anarchists these days in putting greater emphasis on "practical proposals" than on radical resistance. While he has often aligned himself with the radical pacifists—"anarcho-pacifism" is probably the major, and certainly most heroic, American libertarian tradition of the past century—their individualist defiance (acts of disobedience, going to jail, etc.) is not part of Goodman's character. Putting a good construction on it, he often says that

it is much more valuable for an anarchist to be "positive", "heartening", to suggest another, and more humanly proportionate, way of doing things.

Radical libertarians devalue hierarchy and elitism and encourage communal sense and small-group initiative. Again, Goodman puts his emphasis more on the encouraging than on the devaluing. Both, of course, are essential to real freedom and direct action, to the kind of radicalism that provides the only major alternative on the left to Leninist conspiratorial vanguardism. We would not expect Goodman to show much perception on how to refuse, strike, disrupt, or otherwise fight the system. But he does have much to say about schools, therapies, ideas of communities.

The charge is probably correct that most anarchists have "a thing about authority". Goodman has less of this than many and even seems rather conservative on many issues of "authority" and "legitimacy". However, I think it would be fair to summarize his best view this way: he would replace authority-by-force with authority-by-example of those who know and do. (Goodman has had, in the sixties, an enthusiastic student following but much less so now; one of their correct charges has been "implicit elitism" of a rather traditional sort.) While Goodman doesn't like most political authority, it is quite obvious, as one looks through his non-political works, that he has an almost neo-classical reverence for intellectual and cultural authorities. (Recently he had the bad taste to quote, repeatedly, Aristotle on the family and the role of women, on which he is rather antique, to a student audience well-salted with militant women liberationists. Their general response was that Aristotle, Goodman, and male chauvinism were all one to be put down.)

In further definition, we might note that Goodman's anarchism, unlike that usually found in Europe, is *a*-historical—little sense of identity with leftist movements, syndicalism, underclasses; no reference to Italian, Russian or Spanish anarchism; and only minor concern with most of the traditional disputes of the left. The overlooked crux here is that Goodman is basically anti-socialist, in economics as well as in intellectual identity. In contrast, much of the revival of anarchism in contemporary America has been as "libertarian socialism". (See, for example, Noam Chomsky's "Introduction" to the just published American translation of Daniel Guérin's *Anarchism*.) However, Goodman, at least in the past, has strongly identified with the "utopian" tradition, with the ideal possibilities of schools and communities, and from this comes, I think, some of his best work, such as his book *Communitas*.

New Reformation again applies such radicalism to America's overproduction of arbitrary schooling, fatuous techniques, professional class immorality, autocratic organization and politics of resentment, right and left. The very loose theme linking these together is that all such issues show a crisis of values akin to that of the sixteenth century reformation. Goodman's view can only intermittently be identified as anarchist in specific senses. Yet, implicitly, he suggests that anarchism is less an ideology than a demand for more humane and responsive proportions in the organization of modern life.

Much can be learned here from Goodman. Still, even a fellow anarchist often finds him hard to take, especially in book-length immersions. Part-time anarchist Norman Mailer rightly insisted that Goodman's style often belongs in a laundry bag (*Armies of the Night*). This goes beyond dulled descriptions and relentless staining with clichés and slopped-out arguments to a downright messy incompetence—and sometimes on his best issues. Who but another anarchist could even understand his murky references to "workers' control"—perhaps the most central modern anarchist demand? Or to "Intermediate Technology"? (He refers to E. F. Schumacker's fine argument that what the "underdeveloped" need is a limited technical improvement which enriches their way of life rather than the destructive modernization which imposes our way of life.) Even in poignant personal description, such as the long section on the ethics of his dead young son, Goodman lacks a full sense of the dramatic and immediate and richly human. One

of our better social critics insists on being one of our poorer writers.

I don't want to belabour the "literary" point, except at it raises several other problems. Historically, much of Goodman's anarchism comes out of literary-bohemian radical libertarianism—the anti-politics of the modernist artist. He sees himself as first a poet, a writer, and constantly refers to that role. About half of his writing aims to be literature in the usual senses: poems, novels, stories, plays, autobiography and literary criticism. Most of it I judge to be mediocre, or worse, as literature. But I won't pursue that argument here. However, it has another significance: Goodman constantly refers to himself "as a poet" or man of letters, the rebellious artist examining the social scene, the special sensibility with a distinctive role. While that earlier bohemian notion that the rebel must have an identity as an artist no longer looms so large in the contemporary "counter culture", we can see other reasons for it in Goodman. It is hard in contemporary America to be taken seriously as an anarchist—perhaps finally even by one's self. But as an artist, and homosexual, who is a social rebel—that's different! However, when he practices his "utility as a citizen" and writes social criticism, this excuses him from doing a carefully sustained piece of work. So we get the sloppy argument, the weary aside, the pathetic plea, the personal irritation. Part of Goodman's peculiarity here is more than personal—the larger problem of place and performance for a perceptive radical in a competitive and rejecting society. The burden of psychic and stylistic scar tissue often seems large, and disfiguring.

Goodman's harsh remarks against "irresponsible alienated" intellectuals and writers seem true, and confessional. The bathetic egotism of many of his remarks should be placed in this context of outsidership. For years, Goodman could only get published, and fed, through the grace of friends who had little sympathy with his anarchist views. Then, in the late 1950s, came celebritydom in the role of public moralist—mentor of the rebellious young, much in demand as a campus speaker and a representative radical libertarian. From *Growing Up Absurd* on, Goodman was identified with the rebellious young, those he then (and still) calls his "crazy young allies". But during the sixties they became the neo-Marxist New Left and the "counter-culture", to neither of which Goodman was sympathetic. Only with a sense of this history can one understand that much of the *New Reformation* is devoted to an attack on the radical young. Some of the points are well made, as when Goodman argues that most of the effectiveness of the American New Left comes not from its tiresome neo-Marxist rhetoric but from its anarchist sensibility and style of direct action.

But much of the emphasis against the young seems irrelevant, not just injured egotism but an inability to recognize that the New Left and the "youth culture" contain the major libertarian forces now at work in America. We have to excuse Goodman's ponderous role-playing, as when he identifies himself as "one of the half-dozen elder statesmen who have provided propositions and points of view that the young have picked up". In fact, the radical American young got their anarchism from all sorts of weird places—from the preceding Beat writers, from artist-prophets like Ken Kesey, from their twisting exotic religions such as Zen Buddhism into libertarian moralities, from the radically defiant side of the indigenous leftism, and so on. But let us look at this scolding of the dissident young in terms of one of the anarchist arguments in *New Reformation*.

On one of his favourite issues, American education, Goodman makes the shocking argument, to most Americans, that we have too much education. He holds that "so much schooling for so many is not a good idea . . . the majority of so-called students in college and high schools do not want to be there and ought not to be. An academic environment is not the appropriate means of education for most young people, including the bright".

Here he wisely corrects the institutional-ameliorist view that all will be well if only we had more schools and schooling. (Doesn't that curiously parallel the reactionary view that all will be well if only we

had more police and policing?) Surely the increase in education processing and imitation elitism, as well as the increase in phony "professionalism" and other dehumanizing and oppressive division of labour, less expresses "the life of the mind" than its gross exploitation. The anarchist, of course, recognizes that in modern Western societies the inflated schooling disguises means of class indoctrination and state custodial power. In America, education may not yet have passed militarism as our biggest industry (it is close) but it may have as our biggest racket and fraud.

Many of Goodman's principles of educational reformation seem quite sensible, and much indebted to earlier libertarians. For young children, he argues for less imposed pedagogy and for more free and various learning activity. (Such libertarian educational views, as propounded also by John Holt, Herbert Kohl, George Dennison, and many others, are spreading widely.) For adolescents, Goodman would replace most formal secondary schooling with "on-going activities" in the community and with supported but autonomously self-ruled "youth communities". And for young adults, he would drop most formal schooling for apprenticeship in real vocations. Higher education, colleges and universities, should be drastically cut-back from pseudo-training and union-carding and time-serving. (Curiously, Goodman says nothing of their social elitism, though that is also one of their main functions.) "College training should follow, rather than precede [non-school experience and apprenticeships in] the professions." In sum, we should encourage meaningful work and freedom in the world for people, not endless academic indoctrination and busy work for inmates, which is the larger part of contemporary education.

In theory, this is an admirable argument; in exposition, it serves the excellent libertarian function of calling in question the dominant view of the well-intentioned to believe that doses of education (and money and administration) will correct the patent evils of an arbitrary, exploitative and destructive social order, and give an impossible coherence to an insane mass technological civilization. But where Goodman goes wrong is in turning the argument towards moral posturing—especially in castigating the radical students—and not following it into social actuality. Not only does he repeatedly leave the issues to hector the left for not taking his view of education (anti-education in the U.S., after all, has traditionally been a populist-conservative position), but he doesn't ask how we can move towards more libertarian views of schooling. Putting his slogan of "apprenticeship" into American reality, without other drastic institutional changes, is, in fact, a reactionary view. Surely, Goodman must realize the fatuousness and arbitrariness of most jobs in factories and offices and businesses and professions, even if he has had no experience with them. Since colleges become uncontrollable collectives of students these days, there is certainly more freedom there than there would be in isolating and controlled apprenticeships in other American institutions. The increase in schooling in the last two generations (more than 60% of all Californian high school graduates go to college for a while), probably matches the decrease in meaningful alternatives of work and place and escape in a competitive and fragmenting society. As things now stand in most non-academic institutions, Goodman's insistence on "schooling-on-the-job" would be about as humane and free as enlisting in the Marine Corps to get an education and see the world (such as members of the underclasses are driven to). The moralist has expounded good libertarian principles but ignored the social reality.

Furthermore, the dissident students whom he scolds actually now attempt to turn educational institutions into Goodman's unacademic "youth communities". They are more realistic anarchists than he is: the great radical principle in modern societies must be to subvert institutions, liberate them. With a high dudgeon surprisingly like that of the self-interested "liberal" professorate, Goodman disapproves. The young, he says, hypocritically pretend to be students, which confuses what little real schooling and intellectual dialectic may be found in the hired learning. (Goodman's hidden assumptions here include

an unwarranted exaltation and authority for the orthodox traditions of humanism and science, which must be protected against the scornful or indifferent student barbarians.) For the students (and the minority of radical professors) to turn universities into "soul" centres for the underclasses, or communes for dissident lifestylers, or political bases for left-militants, may well be better than the nasty "class" purposes they served in the past or the dangerous mass indoctrination-custodial purposes they mostly serve at present. To confuse the institutions with the humanism and science which rationalize them in a conservative, not a libertarian, principle. A proper anarchist response in our society is to twist institutions into more humane purposes, and where better than hired education?

Goodman admits that many of his proposals are "tinkering" with the system. While I don't want to rehash again the old disputes on reform vs. revolution, it should be evident that for "tinkering" to be libertarian, it must respond with a radical sense of current society. Goodman has partly succeeded in becoming a recognized public moralist in America because he obscures the radical nature, and requirements, of his "practical proposals". And Goodman knows it or he would not, repeatedly, and with self-mystifying charm, describe himself as a "conservative anarchist".

The *New Reformation*, far more than Goodman's earlier books, seems defensive, though whether most defending his conservatism or his anarchism is not always clear. At least three times in the book he somewhat embarrassedly fends off the more radical like this: "If they are right . . . about our inability [to make radical changes with moderate methods] there is no solution but the apocalypse." Understandably, he wants no such insight. The good man's dilemma these days is that he abhors destruction and tyranny, and so reasonably argues that the neo-Leninism (Maoism, *et al*) which increasingly covers and reshapes our radicalism may well lead to "violent collective change" which "would certainly be totalitarian, whatever the ideology". (This he qualifies, wisely, by adding that he does not condemn our protest movements' "venial sins" since "the most brutal and destructive acts will continue to come from those in power".) Currently in America, the problem is a real one because, repeating the "propaganda of the deed" of the late nineteenth century, some radical libertarians (whatever they call themselves) have taken up, or give some support, to partial forms of terrorism. We anarchists, I think, can reject terrorism and conspiratorial actions as usually futile, without becoming conservatives and fearful moralists. In societies with little public freedom but considerable personal freedom, resistance and change and radicalism can find other ways. Whether they will succeed is certainly debatable, and Western civilization is certainly well advanced in its drive towards an apocalyptic end, but, unlike the orthodox Marxists, we need not deify historical progressions and "inevitable" over our radical libertarian views.

Goodman is a libertarian of sufficient non-sectarian perception to know this, to know that radical change and not just his arch "tinkering" with the system are essential. As he says, "unless freedoms are extended they are whittled away." Radical liberation cannot be conserved, only created. That is one of the great anarchist insights.

Since Goodman is aware that the deepest revolution is always more than political and institutional, his basic but ragged theme is that we are now in a "cultural and religious crisis", evident in a "break-down of belief". He cites the loss of legitimacy of fathers and teachers and rulers. I see much good in that, though Goodman apparently doesn't, and believe that anarchists should finally prefer chaos to repressive order. Though several times Goodman suggests the "emergence of a new belief", he doesn't have one and what he really hopes for, as his title indicates, is simply a purging and renewal of the old beliefs, a reformation. Thus a "transformation of conscience"—especially with the scientists and technicians and other professional keepers of the modern pieties—will redirect our over-technologized and misordered society, revivify our corrupt culture, undercut our imperial

power and role, and morally recreate disintegrating community. For an anarchist, Goodman expects rather much from the moral reform of the new technocratic elites. In contrast, I would suggest more truly radical faith—if any is justified—in students and other rebels, in the underclasses and outcast, in individual and communal resistance in the places that we are at.

Goodman plays now and again with his metaphor of the Protestant Reformation applied to our times but doesn't pursue it rigorously. As many scholars have made clear (see G. H. Williams, *The Radical Reformation* for a moderate account), the defeat of the antinomians was the defeat of most radical libertarianism in the reformation. We ex-Protestants are rather more suspicious than Goodman of the dubiously heroic professionals he identifies with as keeping the faith without turning into righteous little Calvins and Luthers and Cromwells instituting a new puritanism while crucifying our anabaptists of the rebellious culture. I want a radically liberated society—some of which is taking place, in fact, around us—not a Miltonic call to moral virtue, which is what part of Goodman's essential view amounts to.

It also seems to me that Goodman sometimes confuses the Whore of Babylon with the reforming moralist, as in his defence of the American Space Programme. He compares the moon missiles, favourably, to Cathedrals. In their futility, wastefulness and elitist control and social function they should be compared to barbaric pyramids, for which they are the technological substitutes. Goodman's logic seems to be that of the conservative's bread-and-circuses—the big technological exploits are about the only good shows going. Granted, Goodman is never without some perceptiveness, as when he notes that "to command the Moon landing was the only [positive] action of John Kennedy that fitted his adolescent mentality". But we would expect an anarchist poet to go further and note the adolescent nihilism of the yearning for inhuman space and the pathological flight from our tangible earth realities. Or to suggest that blowing up a missile would be even more appropriate than blowing up a university, for those impelled to such desperate drama. But Goodman does not, because as conservative moralist he hankers for decent rituals, expert professionalism, vestigial legitimacy, traditional scientific-humanistic culture, and some sense of neoclassical order in present life. So he settles for hectoring scientist-engineers on their social responsibility, the young on their ignorant and disrespectful radicalism, and the rest of us for not recognizing the libertarian insights of our conservative-anarchist "elder statesman".

There are, I agree, some interesting points where conservatives and anarchists share, outside reformist and institutional rationalizing politics, some similar perceptions and views. But with Goodman, the conservative moralist, a public figure, and the libertarian anarchist, a lonely one, don't wash well together. I would rather believe that it is a failure in social awareness than merely personal pique which makes for the contradictions and for his insistence on being "sour on the American young". But in criticizing Goodman for falling away from his own radical libertarianism, I don't mean to "read him out" of anything. We can also learn from conservative anarchists, and Goodman's frequently suggestive, if muddy and irritating, mind. He has some utility as well as courage in his confusions. And no doubt he is right in certain essential points, such as that we can best educate the young by protecting them from too much schooling, best move society by envisioning new possibilities, and best develop anarchism by never treating it as a dogma or thing in itself. Good natural anarchism partly redeems Goodman from his own intellectual dirty laundry as, indeed, such waywardness as his partly helps redeem America from its dirty ways

Bakunin and Marx on Nationalism

Stephen P. Halbrook

ONE OF THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL POINTS of divergence in the Bakunin-Marx rift has been lost in the maze of the more general debates on anarchism versus statism. That point is the question of nationalism. The nature of their dispute on nationalism is not merely of historical interest, for beyond that interest looms questions such as the true nature of anarchism and Marxism, national self-determination and imperialism, and internationalism and reactionary nationalism. "Nationalism" itself encompasses many categories, some revolutionary and some reactionary, and many of these were discussed and made clearer by the antagonists. Yet in the context of the dispute between Bakunin and Marx, the subject can be reduced to two basic points of departure. First is the contradiction between imperialism and national self-determination, which arises between a "civilized" state and other peoples considered "backward" which that state oppresses. Second is the contradiction between "civilized" states themselves, which reaches its zenith when one of the two invades the other.

Throughout his life Bakunin defended the cause of Slav liberation from the imperialists on the East and West, and personally participated and played a leading role in East European insurrections. In 1846 Austria annexed Cracow, where a peasant insurrection had broken out. Bakunin agitated from Paris on their behalf and called for revolution in Russia and a federation of free Slav peoples. When the French Revolution of 1848 began fizzling, he rushed to Poland, stopping along the way to show peasants how to burn barons' castles. At the Prague Congress Bakunin advocated revolution to break the power of the Austrian and Russian governments. He organized Slovaks, Moravians, Croats and Serbs into a secret revolutionary society, and when a new insurrection broke out in Prague on June 12, he was everywhere at once, from the barricades encouraging the fighters to rebel head-

quarters planning strategy. The Czech bourgeoisie applauded the suppression of the insurgents, making clear that the national struggle was at the same time a class struggle. Bakunin recognized this in his famous *Appeal to the Slavs*, arguing for the rising of all Eastern European working classes and of the Russian peasantry. The "emancipation of the peoples within and without" required both national liberation and social revolution. After escaping from Siberia in 1861 Bakunin was once more agitating on behalf of the Slavs from Western Europe, and in 1863 cast his lot with the fighters on the *Ward Jackson*, who were sailing to join the guerrillas at war with Russian soldiers in East Europe. The ship never reached its destination due to the treachery of the captain, and the revolt was later crushed. Bakunin continued agitating from West Europe, and later organized a Slav section of the First International.

The differences between Marxism and anarchism became clear early when Engels attacked Bakunin's *Appeal to the Slavs* in an article "Democratic Pan-slavism", *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, February 1849. The polemic begins with these words:

We have before us the program of democratic Pan-slavism in form of a pamphlet entitled "Manifesto to the Slavs", by a Russian patriot, Michael Bakunin, member of the Slav Congress in Prague, published in Koethen, 1848.

Bakunin is our friend. This will not deter us from criticizing his pamphlet.

Let us see how Bakunin, at the very beginning of his proclamation, links up with the illusions of last March and April: "The very first sign of life of the Revolution was a cry of hate against the old repression, a cry of sympathy and love for all the suppressed nationalities. The peoples . . . at last felt the shame with which the old diplomacy had burdened mankind, and recognized that the well-being of nations will never be secured as long as anywhere in Europe a single people lives under the yoke. . . . Away with oppressors! sounded as one

voice; hail to the oppressed, the Poles, the Italians and all others! No more wars of conquest, but still one last war fought to the finish, the good fight of the Revolution for the final liberation of all peoples. Down with the artificial barriers which were forcibly erected by congresses of despots, according to so-called historic, geographic, commercial and strategic necessities! . . ."¹

Engels proceeded to argue extensively against the right of peoples to be free, claiming that German imperialism was necessary for the "historical development" of Eastern Europe. "But without force and without an iron ruthlessness nothing is accomplished in history" was Engels' excuse. Declaring "political centralization" a great boon to humanity, he adds: "And now the Panslavists come and demand that we should 'free' these half-Germanized Slavs, that we should suspend a centralization which is pressed upon these Slavs by all their material interests."² Possibly it was not so clear to the rebellious Slav peasants that their "material interests" were enhanced by domination of the Western exploiters.

As for Bakunin's belief in the right of all peoples to be free, Engels scornfully remarked:

And will Bakunin reproach the American people for waging a war which to be sure deals a severe blow to his theories based on "Justice and Humanity", but which none the less was waged solely in the interests of civilization? Or is it perhaps a misfortune that the splendid land of California has been wrested from the lazy Mexicans who did not know what to do with it? . . . Because of this the "independence" of a few Spanish Californians and Texans may suffer, occasionally "Justice" and other moralistic principles may be injured, but what do they count compared to such world historic events?³

Apparently Engels deemed it in the "interests of civilization" that chattel slavery, abolished by President Guerrere in 1829, was reintroduced in those territories, just as Polk and the Southern slavocracy planned. Thus, when Engels declares "material progress" as his categorical imperative, he does not refer to the material progress of slaves, nor indeed of "a few Spanish Californians and Texans", the Indian tribes the US government had long before began its policy of genocide against, and all peoples whose—material and spiritual—oppression was enhanced as a result of the US aggression against Mexico. As the *Communist Manifesto* made clear, all these classes were "reactionary" and the material progress of the bourgeoisie was the ideal to be eulogized.

Marx and Engels never changed their minds on the Slavic question, giving sufficient warrant to Bakunin's warning as late as 1873: "Not only are we averse to the idea of persuading our Slav brothers to join the ranks of the Social-Democratic party of German workers, headed by the duumvirate invested with dictatorial power—Marx and Engels—followed by Bebel, Liebknecht, and a few Jewish litterateurs. On the contrary, we shall use all efforts to turn the Slavic proletariat away from a suicidal union with that party, which, by its tendency, aims, and means, is not a folk party, but a purely bourgeois party, and is in addition a German party, that is, anti-Slavic."⁴

The principles debated on the Slav question became the basis for more general principles advocated by Marxism and anarchism respectively in later years.

Ironically, the real nature of the two views on the national question as originally presented are virtually unknown today in that Marx has been totally revised and Bakunin forgotten.

The general Marxian position was first stated in the *Communist Manifesto*. Extolling the virtues of the bourgeoisie, who supposedly were great civilizers, Marx and Engels made the claim that imperialism was progressive:

The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of the towns. It has created enormous cities, has greatly increased the urban population as compared with the rural, and has thus rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life. Just as it has made the country dependent on the towns, so it has made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilized ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West.⁵

Referring to this passage and the *Manifesto* argument that the industrial proletariat should be a new ruling class, Bakunin wrote in *Statism and Anarchy*:

One may ask then: if the proletariat is to be the ruling class, over whom will it rule? The answer is that there will remain another proletariat which will be subjected to this new domination, this new State. It may be, for example, the peasant "rabble", which, as we know, does not stand in great favor with the Marxists, and who, finding themselves on a lower level of culture, probably will be ruled by the city and factory proletariat; or considered from the national point of view, the Slavs, for instance, will assume, for precisely the same reason, the same position of slavish subjection to the victorious German proletariat which the latter now holds with respect to its own bourgeoisie.⁶

This was no idle speculation on Bakunin's part, for a year after the *Manifesto*—in his "Democratic Panslavism"—Engels did in fact advocate dictatorship by the German bourgeoisie or proletariat (whichever happened to be in power) over the Slavs. "We [Germans] and the Magyars ought to guarantee the Austrian Slavs their independence—so Bakunin demands," Engels says, and responds: "We will not think of it," for "hatred of Russia" and of "the Czechs and Croats" is "the first revolutionary passion of Germans," and opts for "a battle of annihilation and ruthless terrorism" against Slav liberation.⁷ In a famous letter to Kautsky dated September 12, 1882 Engels argues that the proletariat should take over the colonies the bourgeoisie had captured and keep them for a period of time.⁸ Today, Maoists like to denounce Russian "social-imperialism"; they do not seem to know that Engels was the founder of the theory of social-imperialism. In his *Letters to a Frenchman* Bakunin presented his critique of bourgeois imperialism and what amounted to social-imperialism:

But do you realize that with this principle one could easily justify any kind of conquest and oppression? The bourgeoisie have always fallen back upon that principle to prove their mission and their right to govern or, what amounts to the same thing, to exploit the world of labor. In conflicts between nations as well as between classes this fatal principle, which is simply the principle of authority, explains and poses as a right all invasions and conquests. Did not the Germans always put forth this

principle by way of justifying their attempts upon the liberty and independence of the Slavic peoples, and of legitimizing the violent and forcible Germanization of the latter? That, they say, is the victory of civilization over barbarism.

Beware, the Germans already are remarking that the German Protestant civilization is much superior to the Catholic civilization of the peoples of the Latin race in general, and of the French civilization in particular. Beware lest the Germans soon imagine that their mission is to civilize you and to make you happy, just as you now imagine that it is your mission to civilize and forcibly free your compatriots, your brothers, the peasants of France. To me both claims are equally hateful, and I declare to you that in international relations, as well as in the relations of one class to another, I will be on the side of those to be civilized in this manner. Together with them I will revolt against all those arrogant civilizers—whether they call themselves Germans or workers—and in rebelling against them I shall serve the cause of revolution against reaction.⁹

An important volume recently published is *Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization*,¹⁰ which is a 450-page collection of Marx's writings on China, India, Mexico, the Middle East, and North Africa. Shlomo Avineri, the editor, sums up the consensus of the articles in these words:

Since Marx postulates the ultimate victory of socialism on the prior universalization of capitalism, he necessarily arrives at the position of having to endorse European colonial expansion as a brutal but necessary step toward the victory of socialism. . . .

The horrors of colonialism are dialectically necessary for the world revolution of the proletariat since without them the countries of Asia (and presumably also Africa) will not be able to emancipate themselves from their stagnant backwardness.

Marx's view of European—and particularly British—colonial expansion is determined by these dialectical considerations. Consequently, Marx's views on imperialism can be painfully embarrassing to the orthodox communist; there certainly is a deep irony in the fact that while Marx's writings on European industrialization are always the first to be used and quoted by non-European Marxists, his writings on India and China are hardly known or even mentioned by them. The Maoists in particular seem to be totally unaware of them; they certainly make much of their particular brand of Marxism look very much out of touch with Marx himself.¹¹

Thus, for instance, Marx claimed that in India the British were laying the basis of a new civilization. He adds that the British created a native army to hold the Indians in check, but that this army would later guarantee Indian "self-emancipation".¹² Apparently Marx's "dialectic" played a trick on him, for today we see in the famine stricken, flesh rotting streets of Bombay the results of British imperialism just as we observe that the army the British created has preserved foreign investments and the feudal land monopoly and has made India a tool of anti-Communism. Another typical example is Engels' statement in 1848: "The conquest of Algeria is an important and fortunate fact for the progress of civilisation."¹³ He left unanswered how the slaughtering of thousands of peasants and the monopolizing of all agricultural lands by a small elite of colonist exploiters

for over a hundred years was in the interests of "civilisation". As one avowed Marxist admits: "It was only later, when the unreality of these various assumptions became clear with the revelation of the true nature of imperialist exploitation, that Marxism dumped this whole approach and called for determined resistance to imperialist expansion all along the line, and for the quickest possible ending of imperialist domination in those areas on which it had fastened itself."¹⁴ In other words, modern "Marxists" have adopted the position of Marx's antagonist Bakunin.

Bakunin wrote: "We want full freedom for all nations, with the right of self-determination for every people in conformity with their own instincts, needs, and will."¹⁵ In his famous pamphlet defending this notion, the only real example Lenin attempted to give where Marx advocated such was Ireland. Lenin bragged about Marx supposedly advocating "the emancipation of Ireland" being "achieved in a revolutionary way".¹⁶ A more objective Marxist has admitted that Marx "contemplated independence for Ireland regretfully".¹⁷ Marx never advocated anything but "legal means" (Marx's words) for separation, and he was not such an energetic supporter of the vanguard of the Irish revolutionary movement, the Fenians, as Lenin imagined. "Bakuninist, braggart, aimless propaganda through action" was Engels' judgment of Fenian tactics.¹⁸ Finally, Marx advocated Irish freedom not because they had a right to secede but because he thought it would give the English working class more control in civilized England.¹⁹

It would be a mistake to claim that Bakunin was a nationalist and as such contradicted socialist internationalism.²⁰ For there is no nationalism in general, rather there is revolutionary nationalism and there is reactionary nationalism. In applauding imperialism, Marx was a reactionary nationalist, and in defending the right of every people to be free, Bakunin was a revolutionary nationalist. As the Marxist Horace B. Davis concedes: "Since the essence of communism is freedom from oppression and the ending of exploitation, Bakunin in calling for self-determination was in a way applying the principle of standing up for the underdog more consistently than Marx and Engels themselves."²¹ That Bakunin advocated only revolutionary nationalism and not nationalism in general becomes clear when he calls for: "Recognition of the absolute right of every nation, small or large, of every people, weak or strong, and of every province, of every commune, to a complete autonomy, provided the internal constitution of any such unit is not in the nature of a menace to the autonomy and freedom of its neighbors." Furthermore, "the right of nationality can be considered only as the natural result of the supreme principle of liberty, ceasing to be a right from the moment it is posed against or even outside of liberty."²² Bakunin was no patriot in that he deplored love of State; yet he was realistic enough to recognize that nationality was a fact and as such must be respected. National self-determination followed naturally. "A fatherland represents the incontestable and sacred right of every man, of every human group, association, commune, region, and nation to live, to feel, to think, to want, and to act in its own way—and this manner

of living and feeling is always the incontestable result of a long historic development."²³

Davis contrasts this with the classical Marxist view: "Marx and Engels were impatient with small nations and would-be nations that stood in the way of economic progress as they saw it. Engels at one time had a brief period of belief in the rights of small nationalities, but Marx was never interested in the principle of self-determination as such, and Engels eventually favored stronger countries against weaker in a positively breathtaking manner."²⁴ It is particularly surprising as to the extent that they supported German militarism, a most rabid form of reactionary nationalism. Marx clapped when the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein were wrested from Denmark and attached to Prussia in 1867.²⁵ Engels was head to shoulders above Marx in his German chauvinism. His anonymous pamphlet *Po and Rhine*, which embarrassed Lenin and which few are even aware of today (so well has it been suppressed), was so militaristic that Marx could write to Engels on May 7, 1861: "Incidentally, regarding your *Po and Rhine*, etc., I was told by Hatzfeld who meets the entire Prussian high military at the home of her brother-in-law and whose nephew, another Nostitz, is an adjutant to 'Wilhelm the handsome' that in the high and highest military circles (including the circle of Prince Karl-Friedrich) your book is considered to be the work of an anonymous Prussian General."²⁶ Engels was even more vehement than Marx in urging German wars on Russia to avenge the Fatherland. An article Engels wrote in 1891 was later used by German Social Democrats to vindicate themselves in supporting German imperialism in World War I. "If, as the Prussian government says, there'll be war in early 1892, we could *en principe* not declare against voting credits now," were his words.²⁷

The best contrast between Bakunin's internationalism and Marx's reactionary nationalism, exhibited itself in the Franco-Prussian War, in which Marx supported the German nation. "On the German side, the war is a war of defence," he claimed in the First Address on the war issued by the International.²⁸ Rather than calling on the cannon fodder on both sides to overthrow Bismarck and Bonaparte, he cast his lot with the German imperialists because "the French need a thrashing", "the centralization of [Prussian] state power will be useful for the centralization of the German working class", and "the centre of gravity of the workers' movement in Western Europe" would be transferred from France to Germany, which would "mean the predominance of *our* theory over Proudhon's, etc."²⁹ On this nationalist basis Marx and Engels attacked Bebel and Liebknecht for refusing to vote for war credits in the Reichstag.³⁰

Bakunin welcomed the German invasion not in hopes of a German victory but with the idea in mind of turning the imperialist war into class war in France and then Germany. "I deem the Prussian invasion a veritable piece of good fortune for France and for

world social revolution," he wrote in September 1870.³¹ Bakunin hoped that the war would shake the foundations of the French government enough for the proletariat and peasantry to abolish it, and that the German working classes would follow their example. Unlike Marx, who harbored a patriotic bias in favor of the government which ruled the country of his birth, Bakunin had no love for any State on earth.

Bakunin and Marx were both nationalists, but of opposite types. To Bakunin's call for national self-determination, Marx and Engels responded with the sanctioning of its antithesis, imperialism, which is one form of reactionary nationalism. Another form is defence of a national state, an attitude Marx and Engels adopted in the case of Germany; to this Bakunin countered his argument in favor of what later came to be known as "revolutionary defeatism", which recognizes that wars between bourgeois States are imperialist on both sides and that such presents an excellent opportunity to overthrow one's own State which in turn leads to the overthrow of the other State. Only Bakunin's position recognized that the workers had no country.

In *Letters to a Frenchman* Bakunin had warned, "It is clear that so long as the goal of the German workers consists in setting up a national State, no matter how free or how much of a people's State they *imagine* it to be, . . . they will ever continue to sacrifice the liberty of the people to the greatness of the State, Socialism to politics, and justice and international brotherhood to patriotism." Referring to World War I, Horace B. Davis points out: "Bakunin's prediction had come true. The German working class had not fulfilled the historic mission set for it by Marx and Engels."³² Davis goes on to point out that the countries influenced by Bakunin acquired more of an anti-imperialist tradition than those where Marx's ideas were more prevalent. For instance, Andrea Costa, who was elected to the Italian Parliament as a Socialist in 1885, had belonged to the Bakuninist faction of the First International. He led the anti-imperialists when Italy began its policies of colonialism in the year of his election. "The opposition in Italy to patriotism and colonialism was related to the continuing influence in the working-class movement of the ideas of Bakunin. In those areas of Spain, such as Catalonia and the Asturias, where Bakunin's ideas were likewise on the ascendant, the anarcho-syndicalist movement was [also] linked . . . with anticolonialism."³³ As Davis concludes: "The followers of Marx in the European countries had been insufficiently alerted to the perils of unthinking nationalism. The followers of Bakunin, who of course were more numerous in Italy, Spain and the Latin countries generally, came off on the whole better in this respect."³⁴ For earlier Marxists, it must have been a bitter pill to swallow when they found that Bakunin had been more sensible than Marx on the national question. Today, the bitter taste is no longer necessary, for what passes for the "Marxist" position on this question had been Bakunin's all along, only hardly anyone knows it.

- ¹Engels, "Democratic Panslavism", in Marx and Engels, *The Russian Menace to Europe* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1952), pp. 68-9.
- ²*Ibid.*, p. 76.
- ³*Ibid.*, p. 71.
- ⁴G. P. Maximoff (ed.), *The Political Philosophy of Bakunin* (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1953), p. 283.
- ⁵Marx and Engels, *Selected Works* (N.Y.: International Publishers, 1968), p. 39.
- ⁶Maximoff, pp. 286-7.
- ⁷Marx and Engels, *The Russian Menace to Europe*, pp. 83-4.
- ⁸Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, p. 688.
- ⁹Maximoff, p. 402.
- ¹⁰(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1968.)
- ¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 12.
- ¹²Article of Aug. 8, 1853. *Ibid.*, pp. 125-31.
- ¹³*Ibid.*, p. 13.
- ¹⁴Horace B. Davis, *Nationalism and Socialism: Marxist and Labor Theories of Nationalism to 1917* (N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1967), pp. 70-1.
- ¹⁵Maximoff, p. 247.
- ¹⁶Lenin, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination", *Selected Works* (N.Y.: International Publishers, 1967), vol. I, p. 641.
- ¹⁷Davis, p. 65.
- ¹⁸Gustav Mayer, *Friedrich Engels* (N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1936), p. 203.
- ¹⁹Cf. especially Marx to Engels, Nov. 30, 1867, *Selected Correspondence* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, from Russian ed. of 1953), p. 236 and Marx to Meyer and Vogt, Ap. 9, 1870, *Ibid.*, p. 285.
- ²⁰Those who seem to have done so include Max Nettlau, "Mikhail Bakunin: A Biographical Sketch" in Maximoff, p. 43 and E. H. Carr, *Michael Bakunin* (N.Y.: Random House, 1937), p. 164.
- ²¹Davis, p. 39.
- ²²Maximoff, pp. 274-5.
- ²³*Ibid.*, p. 324.
- ²⁴Davis, p. 14.
- ²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 63.
- ²⁶Quoted in George Spiro, *Marxism and the Bolshevik State* (N.Y.: Red Star Press, 1951), Vol. III, p. 618.
- ²⁷Davis, p. 49.
- ²⁸*Selected Works*, p. 265.
- ²⁹Marx to Engels, July 20, 1870. Quoted in Franz Mehring, *Karl Marx* (London: Butler and Tanner, 1936), p. 438.
- ³⁰Engels to Marx, Aug. 15, 1870. *Selected Correspondence*, p. 294.
- ³¹Maximoff, p. 399.
- ³²Davis, p. 102.
- ³³*Ibid.*, pp. 115 and 119.
- ³⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 182-3.

THE FIRST SUCCESSES of the struggle of the International led it to free itself from the confused influences of the dominant ideology which survived in it. But the defeat and repression which it soon encountered brought to the foreground a conflict between two conceptions of the proletarian revolution. Both of these conceptions contained an *authoritarian* dimension through which the conscious self-emancipation of the working class is abandoned. In effect, the quarrel which became irreconcilable between Marxists and Bakuninists was two-edged, referring at once to power in the revolutionary society and to the organization of the present movement, and when the positions of the adversaries passed from one aspect to the other, they reversed themselves. Bakunin fought the illusion of abolishing classes by the authoritarian use of state power, foreseeing the reconstitution of a dominant bureaucratic class and the dictatorship of the most knowledgeable, or those who would be reputed to be such. Marx, who thought that a maturing process inseparable from economic contradictions, and democratic education of the workers, would reduce the role of the proletarian State to a simple phase of legitimating the new social relations imposing themselves objectively, denounced Bakunin

and his followers for the authoritarianism of a conspiratorial elite which deliberately placed itself above the International and formulated the extravagant design of imposing on society the irresponsible dictatorship of those who are most revolutionary, or those who would designate themselves to be such. Bakunin, in fact, recruited followers on the basis of such a perspective: "Invisible pilots in the centre of the popular storm, we must direct it, not with a visible power, but with the collective dictatorship of all the *allies*. A dictatorship without badge, without title, without official right, yet all the more powerful because it will have none of the appearances of power." Thus two *ideologies* of the workers' revolution opposed each other, each containing a partially true critique, but losing the unity of the thought of history, and instituting themselves into ideological *authorities*. Powerful organizations, like German Social-Democracy and the Iberian Anarchist Federation faithfully served one or the other of these ideologies; and everywhere the result was greatly different from what had been desired.

—Section 91 from *Society of the Spectacle* by Guy Debord. A Black and Red translation.

Class Struggles in Poland

continued from page 8

but not in Gdansk!

On Sunday, December 13, an official government announcement, published in the national press, named 46 items of food and fuel which were to be increased immediately, and 40 other items—all consumer durables—which were to be reduced in price. It was also announced that the new wage structure to begin on January 1, 1971, would freeze wages for one year. Food price increases included—milk, up 8%; fish up 11%; sugar up 14.2%; flour up 16%; meat up 17.6%; jam up 36.8%, and coffee up 92%. Coke and coal prices were increased from 10 to 20% depending on the grade. On the other hand, TV sets, refrigerators, washing machines and other consumer durables were reduced between 15 and 30% in price. Two years ago, meat prices had risen between 20 and 40%, fruit and vegetables (outside the State retail system) rocketed and some imported food products, like citrus fruits, chocolate and cocoa virtually disappeared. Coffee fetched over 800 zlotys a kilo on the black market.

Reactions to the latest announcement, naturally, came swift and very forcibly. Coming as it did, just before Christmas, the government's announcement was just too much for the average Polish working-class housewife to bear. The government only had itself to blame for the subsequent explosion.

* * * *

STRIKE!

It was not surprising, therefore, that things came to a head in Gdansk's Lenin shipyard on Monday morning, December 14. The management had been resisting the workers' demands that a recent wage incentive system be altered. On the previous Saturday, Stanislaw Kociolek, the region's former Party boss and now the country's Vice-Premier, made an unscheduled visit to the city. Port workers hoped that he had come to help ease the situation; but, as the press reported the next day, he had come to discuss problems connected with retail prices to be announced that night. By first thing Monday morning, Mr. Kociolek had disappeared, and was on his way back to Warsaw. The workers had had enough.

They downed tools—except for a considerable number of lengths of chain and pieces of lead piping!—and, together with their representatives or strike committee which it had now become, marched towards the Gdansk UWP headquarters. At first it was a quiet, almost sullen, column of several thousand; but it was soon joined by housewives and students, and became more volatile. They began to sing the *Internationale*. Before going to the Party headquarters, they converged on the local militia building, where the police could only hold them off by firing into the crowd. The militia was heavily outnumbered until reinforcements arrived, and was able to drive the demonstrators back. The UWP headquarters was then attacked, and the railway station set on fire. Demonstrators fought with firemen in an attempt to stop them putting the fire out. There was also considerable looting (of fur coats

according to one observer!), and a number of cars in front of the shipyards were burned. Fighting escalated quickly into major pitched battles throughout the city. The fighting between workers, housewives and students on the one hand, and the militia and, later, the army on the other, lasted over two days in Gdansk.

By Tuesday, the strike and general unrest spread to the adjoining cities of Gdynia and Sopot, which together comprise a population of over 600,000. And by Wednesday morning, the port of Szczecin, 125 miles to the west of the Gdansk-Gdynia-Sopot area, was also in a state of rebellion. A dusk-to-dawn curfew was imposed, and the police ordered the break-up of all public meetings, both indoors or out. On Wednesday, army tanks moved into Gdansk and took up strategic positions in the city; and a dusk-to-dawn curfew was also imposed there as well. The local radio station ordered the police to use their arms "in self-defence", because of "continued attacks on authority". Throughout the period, all communications with the rest of Poland had been cut off. An early report said that the authorities had admitted that, in Gdansk alone, six people (workers and demonstrators) had been killed—by shooting?—and that 150 militiamen had been injured. A number of government officials "had been murdered" in the city. Also on Wednesday, the government "announced to the nation" that the authorities would act with all determination against "violators of public order" and "against all anti-State activities". The government, moreover, blamed "adventurist elements" for the upheavals in the Baltic ports, while Stanislaw Kociolek hurriedly promised the shipyard workers "substantial rises" in pay, in 1971.

It was not until Thursday, December 17, that the top government and Party leadership really began to explain—and explain away—the situation to the Polish nation. Warsaw television broadcast an order to police and troops to fire on rioters who attacked people and buildings; and continued that the government solemnly invoked the authority of the Constitution to order the use of all legal means, "including arms", against persons perpetrating violent attempts against life and limb of citizens, the pilfering and destruction of property, and of public amenities. It also called on all the people to obey all regulations issued by the State organs to ensure public order. A state of emergency had been declared.

Following the order, Mr. Cyrankiewicz, the Polish Prime Minister, spoke on TV. "Our past is full of heroism and glory," he said, "but also of disasters and ill-considered reactions. For the past two centuries, we have been going from defeat to defeat. The existence of the nation is at stake." After setting the scene, he admitted that more than a dozen people had been killed and several hundred wounded in three days of clashes in Gdansk and other parts of Poland's northern Baltic coast. Many public buildings had been burned and demolished, many shops looted and plundered, and breaches of law and order. "There were tragic clashes in which the forces maintaining order were forced to use arms," he admitted. "These are the painful results of lack of reason, and understanding, and feelings of responsibility, on the part of those who abandoned work, and went into the streets, giving a chance to adventurers and enemies; to vandalism, looting and

murder. Hostile forces are trying to create new bonfires of anarchy, to disturb the normal rhythm of work in the factories and disorganise the life of the country." The Prime Minister then mentioned the recent agreement under which the Federal German Republic recognised Poland's frontiers. "The agreement," he said, "had been received with satisfaction by the whole nation. Let this be borne in mind by the inhabitants of Gdansk, Gdynia, Szczecin and all the Polish western territories."

The same day, the Communist national newspaper, *Trybuna Ludu*, stated: "The (Gdansk) shipyard has difficult problems which could have caused friction, connected with the improvement of work organisation, the indispensable modernisation of the enterprise and the need for a considerable decrease in production costs. These problems, which require to be talked over with the participation of the personnel and be given a proper solution, have recently been the subject of discussion which continues to be necessary in the shipyard. Unfortunately, instead of examining them calmly and in a businesslike manner at meetings in the shipyard itself, part of the personnel did not resist irresponsible appeals, quitting work and going out on to the streets. In order to aggravate the atmosphere, the instigators took advantage of the change of retail prices introduced a few days ago. This change was indispensable. It lies in the interest of the economic development of the country. . . . An end must be put to anarchy. Normal life and work must be restored. Those responsible for arson and robbery must be punished." *Trybuna Ludu* then called on the shipyard workers to "return to work as soon as possible" and make up the losses caused in the last few days.

However, on the very day that the report was published in the paper, workers at the Cegielski Diesel Main Engine Works in Poznan, the automobile assembly plant at Zeran and many coalminers in Silesia went on strike. Radio Szczecin repeated several times that the port had suffered a "great disaster" and that "bandit elements" had set fire to buildings and had looted shops and other public property; but it claimed that life in the port was "almost" back to normal!

* * * *

"DOWN WITH THE RED BOURGEOISIE!"

By Thursday, rumblings of discontent were being heard in Cracow and Wroclaw, where people had been gathering in groups in the market squares. The militia quickly sealed off the areas. Flights from Warsaw airport to Poznan and Cracow were temporarily cancelled; and no phone calls were allowed to Katowice. Radio Warsaw, however, was claiming that things were "back to normal" in Gdansk. But despite earlier reports that Szczecin was quiet, the local radio was still warning people of the dusk-to-dawn curfew. Thursday also saw the return of Mr. Kociolk to Gdansk, where he said on local television, that the workers had put forward many demands "often in ultimatum form", but added that "the majority of these demands are incapable of fulfilment".

Friday's *Glos Pracy* (the Trade Union paper) said: "The painful and tragic events of recent days are

causing depression and concern. They have become the cause of many personal human tragedies, and of great material losses affecting the whole of the population. Adventurism prevailed over prudence, indispensable in difficult situations, and trouble-makers hiding behind the shoulders of the working-class, have committed acts of violence and breaches of public order." And on the same day, *Trybuna Ludu* commented: "The events on the coast prove that abandoning work and going on the streets threatened us with incalculable results, hitting the basic interests of the State."

Saturday in Poland, unlike in Britain and most industrial countries, is as much a working day as the rest of the week. However, many workers, particularly in Szczecin, did not turn up for work. There were, according to the local radio, "interruptions of normal working in some enterprises including the shipyard". There were also demonstrations and some fighting between workers and militia in the small town of Elblag. And in Warsaw, factory managers had reported go-slows in a number of plants. Units of the ORMO had been moved into several factories, including the Fiat assembly plant, a steel mill and the printing works where the official Communist newspaper, *Trybuna Ludu*, is printed. Slogans appeared on walls of the capital proclaiming: "Down With The Red Bourgeoisie!". Radio Warsaw reported that Christmas shopping was in full swing!! In another broadcast, the commentator said that "It would be easy and convenient to use the word 'hooligan' to describe what had happened; however, the use of such a word exclusively would be too simple. The population must not allow themselves to be provoked". Foreign observers began to note at the weekend that there had been a slight softening in the original line that the riots and strikes were the work of "hooligans" and "anarchists".

There were, indeed, some signs that things generally had simmered down somewhat by the weekend. Statements by government officials and politicians had, moreover, become less inflammatory, more conciliatory. Road and rail movements to and from Gdansk had been restored, but Szczecin was still cut off from the country on Sunday. But in Poland generally, political and economic activity was now intense. For the first time for decades, the workers were openly stating their demands for higher wages and for a complete overhaul of the incentive system. *Trybuna Ludu* was now saying: "We must and we shall discuss the matters and problems—and even the conflicts—which have arisen from the fact that our economy has entered a new stage of development"; and the other Warsaw daily, *Zycie Warszawy*, said that it was a social, civic and political duty to open "a dialogue on the questions which have arisen and have now assumed such a painful character". Then a new political bomb burst!

* * * *

ALL QUIET IN THE WESTERN PORTS

At a special meeting of the central committee of the UWP in Warsaw on Sunday, Mr. Wladyslaw Gomułka resigned as Party First Secretary, and was replaced by Mr. Edward Gierek, the former miners' leader and

Silesian district UWP secretary. Besides accepting Mr. Gomulka's resignation, the central committee relieved four other members of the 12-man political bureau of their posts. They were Marshal Marian Spychalski, Head of State; Zenon Kliszko, a leading ideologist and bureau secretary; Boleslaw Jaszczuk, the economic "genius" who had announced the introduction of the increased food prices which had sparked off the unrest; and Party organiser Ryszard Strzelecki. Mieczslaw Moczar, former Minister of the Interior (State security police), joined the political bureau. He is, once again, responsible for security and the armed forces. Mr. Kociolek was also promoted to the bureau.

In the evening, addressing the nation on television, Mr. Gierek said that events had taken place which deeply shocked the entire community. "The coastal cities of Gdansk, Gdynia, Szczecin and Elblag became the scene of workers' demonstrations, disturbances and street clashes. People have been killed. All of us feel this tragedy," he continued. Furthermore, "The recent events reminded us in a painful manner of the fundamental truth that the Party must always maintain a close link with the working class and the nation." He said that the government must always consult the working class and intelligentsia, "to respect the principles of collective decision-making and democracy". The central committee, therefore, has committed the political bureau to examine, "within the next few days", the possibility of improving the situation of families which have the lowest earnings and a large number of children, whose budgets have been most badly affected as a result of recent price changes. "There are," he went on, "many other problems hurting the working people and requiring solutions. They include the situation of working women, the housing problem and the problems of youth." Mr. Gierek promised that the draft economic plan for 1971 and the following years would be re-examined.

Shipyard workers at Szczecin agreed to return to work on Monday morning; and about 80% of the shipyard workers of Gdansk and Gdynia were officially reported to be back at their jobs by Monday. The Soviet Communist Party leader, Leonid Brezhnev, sent a message of greetings to Mr. Gierek, describing him as "a sincere friend of the Soviet Union"—just in case anyone thought that he might not be! On Tuesday morning, the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic met and repealed the State of Emergency, withdrawing authority given in the order of the previous week for the militia, army and State security police to use guns against strikers, rioters and looters.

On the same day, moreover, the Polish press began a campaign against Mr. Gomulka. *Zycie Warszawy*, the principle Warsaw daily, said the cause of the "deep crisis" in which the country found itself was that "the dialogue between the leadership and the people has been broken off, and replaced by one-sided orders, often decided on in a very narrow circle. These decisions, even if they were right, were presented to the community in a manner which led to grave errors. . . . The Polish community has been waiting for long for the credibility gap between the nation and the Party to be overcome, for the dialogue to be re-established, and the State machinery put effectively into order so that it could serve more efficiently the nation". And,

continued the paper, "The changes made in the last few days have opened up a new chance for us. The new leadership, the country and each of us have been given this chance. But nothing can be done automatically. It is necessary to change the style of governing—in Warsaw, in the regions, in the districts and rural communities, in the Party and in the administration. We must admit it plainly: arbitrariness and autocracy were quite frequent. . . . The recent tragic events at the basis of which was discontent of the working class, came as a serious warning for the future. Far-reaching, binding and thorough conclusions should be drawn from that. The changes should be lasting, but cannot be fast. . . . Further economic changes which can bring a general improvement of the situation in the country will require much more time".

Two days before Christmas Day, on the Wednesday, a "new" government was formed. The measures were announced to a special session of the *Sejm*. Marshal Marian Spychalski was replaced as Head of State by Mr. Josef Cyrankiewicz, who resigned his post as Prime Minister and then himself became Head of State. Mr. Piotr Jaroszewicz, the former Deputy Prime Minister, became Prime Minister. Another palace "revolution"! Mr. Jaroszewicz did, however, announce: "We consider it necessary that the government pass a resolution on the matter of freezing, for a period of at least two years, all prices of foodstuffs with the exception of those articles whose prices are of a seasonal nature. As far as the prices of industrial goods are concerned they should be gradually reduced in proportion to the growth of production and further reduction of production costs." But the two-year freeze was not the concession it first appeared to be. It meant that the price increases which sparked off the unrest would remain in force. The dusk-to-dawn curfew in Szczecin was lifted.

And so Christmas came to Poland.

* * * *

"CALM AND SOCIAL PRUDENCE"

Following Christmas, life in Poland settled down to an uneasy quiet—for a short while. But by the end of December, however, there began a considerable amount of soul-searching in the press. On the 30th of the month, the magazine *Polityka* commented that "Although there are various degrees of responsibility, the Party is responsible for the causes which gave rise to the tragic events. Elements of stagnation were growing in the economy. The picture presented by propaganda was far from reality. Such practices sanctioned the very dangerous social phenomenon of double-thinking—having one standard 'for show' and another for private use for close friends. . . ." And, continued *Polityka*, "Of course, the street demonstrations were not the correct forum to present political postulates, but we have to admit that a conscious activity by the workers did not leave wide room for manoeuvring by hostile and anti-social elements". The demonstrations, strikes and general unrest were "an alarm signal indicating that the illness still exists in the political and social organism".

On January 5, the Polish newspapers reported that the Central Committee of the United Workers' Party

would soon be meeting in order, as the Communist paper *Trybuna Ludu* put it, "... to make a detailed revaluation of the events of December, and of the results of the last Five Year Plan". And another Communist paper, *Trybuna Mazowiecka*, said that "The lack of consultation between the working class and the Party leadership and officials was a distinct departure from the principles of Lenin concerning Party life". The newspaper admitted, moreover, that the decision to raise food prices by an average of 20%, just before Christmas, was the "drop that made the cup overflow"; it was "the detonator which caused the explosion".

But the struggles of the workers were far from over. On Monday, January 11, a group of shipyard workers in Szczecin attempted a strike. A member of the UWP politburo, Mr. Jan Szyaiak, reported the strike attempt at a plenary meeting, the same day, of the Szczecin Party organisation, according to the local Communist paper, *Głos Szczeciński*. He said that the strike attempt was made by a small group of workers on the first shift at the Adam Warski shipyard. They had, he claimed, tried to persuade other workers to down tools, but had been unsuccessful. Their lack of success showed the calm and social prudence among Polish workers, concluded Mr. Szyaiak. But things were not so calm as he thought. Other observers noted persistent tensions and general dissatisfaction among shipyard workers in Szczecin and in Gdansk. Indeed, at the same plenary meeting, the resignation of Mr. Antoni Walaszek, who had been First Secretary of the Szczecin UWP for over ten years, was accepted because of the difficulties he was experiencing in directing local Party activity!

Then, on Thursday, January 14, a number of workers at Elbląg staged a number of lightning strikes and walk-outs; on Saturday, between 3,000 (the official figure) and 6,000 shipyard workers struck in Gdansk. And on Monday morning, 3,000 walked out again. They gathered for over an hour in front of the manager's office in the Lenin shipyard. Furthermore, they had drawn up a list of demands; these included a larger share of the national income, new Trade Union elections, the release of workers—said to be over 200—arrested during the December strikes and upheavals, greater freedom of the press to report grievances, and the removal from the politburo of General Moczar, the security police chief, and Mr. Stanisław Kociulek, the former Gdansk Party leader. The workers also demanded that Mr. Gierek, who succeeded Mr. Gomulka as First Secretary, visit the shipyard. They then returned to work. After the demonstration, Mr. Stanisław Celichowski, a local Communist official, admitted that the workers were dissatisfied with the efforts of both Mr. Kociulek and Mr. Gierek. He added that they had presented so many demands that "it would take a whole session of the government to deal with them". Mr. Celichowski, moreover, indicated that the authorities might again take strong action against the workers. "We must ask ourselves," he said, "just how long can the government go on being threatened; each day sees new demands, and when the previous leadership said that there was no more money for increasing wages, Gierek found it for the lower-paid workers, but unfortunately some people think that they can get more

by pressing harder." But in a broadcast over Gdansk radio a worker from the precision engineering works at Oliwa complained about the differentials between the ordinary workers and the bureaucrats. He said: "We have it every day, the treatment of workers, relations between men and management, the wrong distribution of bonuses, the wrong size of bonuses for workers and directors." A worker from the Lenin shipyard in Gdansk complained about the outdated machinery, some of which dated back to 1939. And not only that, he said, but machines supplied from the Soviet Union were often useless or unsuitable for the work that they were meant to do.

* * * *

HOW MANY HEADS HAS HYDRA?

More strikes swept through Gdansk on Wednesday, January 20. Tram and bus workers walked out to attend a mass demonstration. Public transport management officials admitted that the workers had presented demands for higher wages, better working conditions and more safety measures. They chanted slogans demanding money to make up for the price increases. The meeting was, however, much calmer than a meeting between the workers' representatives and the management the previous day. Mass meetings also took place in the Gdansk shipyards to elect new workers' councils. And by Friday, all the shipyard workers at Szczecin had come out on strike again. Once again, the workers demanded higher pay and a further change in the country's government. The official Party newspaper, *Trybuna Ludu*, accused "certain people" of wanting to create "anarchy". It called for more repression against strikers and demonstrators.

Following the new unrest along the Baltic coast, Mr. Gierek visited Gdansk on Monday, "to listen to the grievances" of the shipyard workers. During his visit, Mr. Gierek met about 300 workers from Gdansk, Gdynia and Sopot. Mr. Gierek had, in fact, just arrived from Szczecin where he had managed to persuade 10,000 shipyard workers there to return to work. They had been on strike since Friday. Transport workers had joined them on Saturday and Sunday. They, too, had been demanding improved wages and reorganisation of the government. On Tuesday, the Gdansk workers also returned to work. Mr. Gierek then went back to Warsaw—and appealed to Polish workers to work harder. The government disclosed that it would postpone, "for a year at least", the unpopular bonus incentive scheme which had contributed to the unrest of the last few weeks. And on January 27, the UWP committee in the Lenin shipyard in Gdansk replaced its First Secretary and six other leading bureaucrats.

It was not, however, only in Gdansk that heads were—once again—rolling within the United (!) Workers' Party. Differences among the top leaders had forced the postponement of the Central Committee meeting which should have been held at the end of January and the beginning of February. Rumour had it that there was a conflict between General Moczar and Mr. Gierek. Indeed, many workers had been calling for Moczar's resignation. They blamed him for much of the killing in December. When the plenary meeting of the Central Committee was held, the Party's economic "specialist", Bolesław Jaszczyk, was accused of serious errors.

According to Mr. Stefan Olszowski, a politburo member, Mr. Jaszczuk tried to justify himself. At the same meeting, Mr. Gomulka was suspended from the Central Committee for what Mr. Gierk called "serious mistakes". They included, said Mr. Gierk, the weakening of the Party's links with the people, incorrect development of the country's economy and the causing of a political crisis over the increase of food prices. Mr. Zenon Kliszko, the Party's ideologist, was also removed because he had done "serious harm to the Party in directing the cadre policy, and during the December events on the coast showed lack of reality, and acted irresponsibly in contributing to the sharpening of the conflict in Gdansk, Gdynia and Szczecin". He was also blamed for ordering force to be used against strikers. A number of other members, including the Trade Union leader Mr. Ignacy Logs-Sowinski, asked to be allowed to step down. All in all, seven members of the committee have resigned or have been removed since Christmas. At the time of writing the committee has only ten members—and is likely to stay that way, at least until the next Party congress.

Unfortunately, "comrade" Moczar has emerged as the number two in the Communist hierarchy of Poland. He has the responsibility for the army, internal security and the Ministry of Health. After Mr. Gierk, he is the most powerful man in the Politburo. In addition, one of his henchmen, Stefan Syowski, has control of the press, information, culture and youth. Following the meeting, Mr. Gierk promised the Polish people "a better life". He listed hard work, tighter discipline, modernised management and economy, and improved living conditions—in that order!


By the second week of February unrest moved south—to Lodz. On Friday the 12th, workers from seven textile plants struck for higher wages. Most of them, of which there were many thousands, were women. Because of the seriousness of the situation, the Prime Minister, Mr. Jaroszewicz, hurried to the city; and on Sunday he met the delegates and activists who were assembled in the Opera House. He told them that the wage increases, announced only the day before in the *Sejm*, were as far as the government could go. The Bill, which had been given a first reading, would increase wages by an average of 4.2%. "It is necessary," he continued, "for everyone to understand that a further increase of expenditure for wages and mass consumption would mean starting on the road to economic adventurism, and worsening the market's balance." An extra £6 millions would be allocated for improving the Health Service, £25 millions for Social Welfare and smaller sums for the handicapped and for extra holiday facilities. The extra income, he told the workers, would come from increased industrial production and productivity, and from higher taxes on private businesses and shops. He then returned to Warsaw. And on the following evening another—and this time much pleasanter—surprise and concession was revealed to the Polish masses.

* * * *

ELBOW ROOM . . .

At the beginning of the evening's news bulletin on Warsaw television, Mr. Jaroszewicz came on the screen and addressed the viewers. He read a brief announce-

ment stating that the government and the politburo of the United Workers' Party had decided that, as from March 1, all food and meat prices which had been increased last December, would be repealed. This really was a concession! The cuts were possible, he said, because of credits granted by the Soviet Union a few days previously. "The direct cause of working class dissatisfaction," continued Mr. Jaroszewicz, "has now been removed, and the government will enforce this decision at improving the conditions of the working people."



However, the announcement by the politburo did also say that the cuts in food prices would be possible only if production was stepped up. "The decisions which were taken demand increased deliveries of food, the use of all reserves in agriculture, and especially the growth of livestock and the increase of exports to cover the increased imports of food," said the politburo statement. Following the television appearance by the Prime Minister, and the announcement of price cuts, the Lodz strikers held a special midnight delegate meeting, and agreed to return to work on Tuesday morning. Almost all the workers returned. During the week, many leading Communist bureaucrats either resigned their positions or were replaced. Mr. Gierk, the Party First Secretary, continued to rush about the country, addressing workers and Party officials. There were also many changes in the leadership of the Trade Unions. Radio Warsaw reported at the end of February that the Trade Union organisations were "undergoing a crisis of confidence, because the workers' protests had disclosed errors, weaknesses and failures by the Trade Unions to defend their interests." The Trade Union paper, *Glos Pracy*, said that the unrest was an expression of lack of confidence and criticism of the Trade Unions.


On March 1, the price reductions duly came into force. Besides these, the prices of consumer goods like TV sets, refrigerators and washing machines, which had in fact been lowered in December, remained the same. The economic journal, *Zycie Gospodarcze*, said that the result of the changes in real wages would be an increase of 4.5 per cent. Personal incomes would rise by 7 per cent; and in some areas the increases would be even greater. In Lodz, for example, where average pay is low because of the large numbers of women workers (no equal pay here!), the restoration

of lower food prices could raise real wages by as much as 15 per cent. The Party weekly, however, sounded a rather sour note when it wrote: "We must rebuff the forces which want to rock the boat of People's Poland still further." And the Bishops of the Roman Catholic Church, not to be left out in the cold, forecast a gradual return to normal relations between the Church and the Communist authorities. Mr. Gierk appeared anxious for "an understanding" with the Catholic Church. Obviously, all would be for the best in the best of all possible (Polish) worlds—as long as the workers trusted their new "leaders", went to Church regularly and did not engage in subversive activities such as striking or demonstrating in the streets!

* * * *

... BUT NOT ENOUGH

What have the Polish workers achieved during the struggles of the last few weeks of 1970 and the first two months of 1971? At considerable loss of life (officially put at 45 dead) and limb, they have won a battle, or to be more accurate a series of battles, against their State employers; they have toppled a government, but have not removed the institution of government as such (that was not their object anyway); they have humbled and discredited a once all-powerful, monolithic and monopolistic political party; they have, at least for some time to come, improved their standard of living, their real wages; and they have achieved some degree of individual and social freedom, and more room to manoeuvre and continue the struggle—if they so desire—for real emancipation from bureaucracy, exploitation and wage-slavery. But they have not, as yet, actually won the war, the war against State capitalism in Poland. As elsewhere, that is yet to come.



SZCZECIN: 18 December 1970. When the food prices were increased, the Communist Party Headquarters were raided, the windows smashed, and set on fire. Photo UPI.


Kropotkin's Anarchist Communism

PETER KROPOTKIN has real claims to be taken seriously as a social and political thinker, and there is at least more chance of this happening now than at any other time since his death exactly half a century ago. As the best-known anarchist writer, he is getting his share of attention in the current revival of interest in anarchism. It is becoming easier to read what he wrote, as distinct from what other people have written about him. Of his dozen books, most of those in English have been reprinted in the United States during the past few years, and during the next few years we may hope to see new translations of those published only in French or Russian, as well as new collections of the many shorter writings he never published in book form. Meanwhile, here are two American selections which are mainly useful because they show how the job of getting Kropotkin into print is *not* to be done.

Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets is one of a new series of reprints of anarchist titles begun by Dover Publications last year. It is a paperback facsimile of a book first published in 1927 (and already reprinted in an expensive cloth edition in 1968). Roger Baldwin, secretary of the American Civil Liberties Union for many years, was drawn towards philosophical anarchism by the influence of Kropotkin, and compiled the book as an act of homage. It gathered together thirteen of Kropotkin's shorter writings which were mostly familiar but were not otherwise available in one place, and in some cases were not otherwise available in English at all (thus it contained the first translations of his pamphlet on prisons, of part of his postscript to the posthumous Russian edition of his first book, *Paroles d'un Révolté*, and of his last fragment on the Russian Revolution).

Unfortunately many items were cut-up to half of the original text at times—often without any indication. They were jumbled up in no particular order, and linked by a sloppy commentary. Baldwin added an eccentric bibliography and an unreliable series of introductions. Then he foolishly made high claims for his work, not realising that nearly every detail he carefully mentioned revealed his ignorance of some other detail. In fact the book was a mess; and of course it still is a mess, since the method of reprinting means that it is completely unaltered. Baldwin has even managed to make things worse by contributing a new introduction which, far from correcting any of his old mistakes and misunderstandings, actually perpetrates several new ones. Yet the book will remain valuable as a miscellaneous collection of elusive material by Kropotkin until it is superseded.

Selected Writings on Anarchism and Revolution might have been expected to do just that, but it does nothing of the kind. Despite its fantastic price, it contains little more actual Kropotkin material (100,000 words, rather than 90,000), and as it happens there is no overlap at all between the two books. Martin Miller, an academic who has written a thesis on Kropotkin's formative years, has attempted a work of scholarship rather than homage, but it is not much better than Baldwin's amateurish effort. It gathers together eleven of Kropotkin's shorter writings, the most important being the first translation of his first major political work—the long memorandum he wrote for his colleagues in the Russian populist movement in 1873. The manuscript was seized by the police when his group was broken up in 1874, and it has remained in the Russian state archives ever since, being printed in 1921 and 1964. It is good to have this in English at last, but the translation (by Victor Ripp) is so literal and the comment (by Miller himself) so jejune that much of its appeal is lost.



So for three guineas you can have a score of items from Kropotkin's vast output, if you don't mind some poor editing (it should be added that both books are beautifully produced). But until a more satisfactory collection appears, to study Kropotkin properly it is still necessary to read him in the original publications—not only his books, but also and especially his many articles and pamphlets, which he himself said were 'far more expressive of my anarchist ideas' (which is why these two selections are welcome despite all their defects). Over the years I have found more than two hundred important items which have never been published in book form, and there must be as many more. What kind of figure emerges from such a study, a century after his political career began and half a century after it ended, and how does it differ from the one we are used to?

There is no need for a fundamental revision of the known facts of Kropotkin's life—which are given in his own *Memoirs of a Revolutionist* (1899) and in the biography by George Woodcock

and Ivan Avakumovic, *The Anarchist Prince* (1950)—though there is room for the correction of many details. What is needed is a reinterpretation of the thrust of his work. It is easy to be led astray by mere surface factors—as Woodcock and Avakumovic were in their title, ignoring Kropotkin's repudiation of his rank from the age of eleven—and the familiar picture of the funny old man with the bald head, fan beard, and benevolent eyes peering through rimless spectacles effectively obscures the real Kropotkin.

The conventional Kropotkin is the one described in Oscar Wilde's crazy phrase about 'a man with the soul of that beautiful white Christ that seems coming out of Russ', or more soberly in Herbert Read's introduction to his anthology, *Kropotkin: Selections from his Writings* (1942): 'Kropotkin, gentle and gracious, infinitely kind and nobly wise, but not a terrifying man: he was a seer, a prophet, but above all a scholar.' In fact, if Kropotkin had anything to do with Christ, it was only in bringing not peace but a sword; and, though his private life may have been beyond reproach, as a political thinker he was indeed a rather terrifying man.

Kropotkin certainly saw himself as 'above all a scholar'. He first made his reputation as a brilliant young geographer, carrying out pioneering expeditions in East Asia and putting forward striking hypotheses about the orography and glaciation of the continent. He continued his original work after joining the populist movement in 1872, and even after his arrest in 1874, but not after his escape to the West in 1876. During his forty years' exile his distinctive contribution to social and political thought was the attempt to establish a scientific basis for anarchism. Apart from making a living as a scientific journalist, he produced many political books with an explicit scientific framework. *Fields, Factories and Workshops* (1899) argued that advanced agricultural techniques could rationalise and humanise the economies of industrial countries; *Mutual Aid* (1902) argued that co-operation, which was at least as important as competition in biological evolution, could assist the social evolution of mankind; the unfinished *Ethics* (1922) argued that human morality should be considered on the same biological lines; and *Modern Science and Anarchism* (1901) argued that the whole movement of nineteenth-century science was in the direction of anarchism.

By science Kropotkin meant natural science—especially biology—and not philosophy or economics. He rejected both religion and metaphysics at an early age, and followed the empiricist rather than the rationalist tradition in European thought. His writing was always descriptive rather than speculative, concrete rather than abstract. His immediate intellectual background was the Russian 'enlightenment' (*prosvetitelstvo*) of the 1860s, which was firmly rooted in current scientific advances. But he often lapsed from science into scientism: the fallacy that scientific methodology can be extended into all fields of investigation without loss of precision. Similarly, when he ventured into history—notably in his pamphlet *The State: Its Historic Role* (1897) and his frequent studies of the French Revolution and the Paris Commune—he often lapsed into historicism: the analogous fallacy that historical methodology can not only trace the pattern of the past but also predict the pattern of the future. He attacked the facile positivism of Huxley and Spencer, but fell into the same trap himself, and his mechanistic arguments for anarchism have dated badly.

Apart from that there are two articles on the Russian revolutionary movement written for liberal periodicals in England, which are interesting but unimportant; three essays which are familiar and already accessible; and five letters, of which four—on the First World War and the Russian Revolution—are important. As an extra, there is the first translation of Bonch-Bruевич's account of the meeting he arranged between Kropotkin and Lenin in Moscow in 1919. Miller hasn't mutilated his material as Baldwin did, but his editorial apparatus is full of errors and omissions, and its professional pretensions make it more rather than less irritating. The long introduction contains nothing fresh, and the whole book adds little to our knowledge or understanding of Kropotkin. The sad thing is that Miller really knows a lot about the Russian background, and if only he had stuck to a book on Kropotkin and Russia he might have produced something worthwhile.

Such lapses derived from Kropotkin's own personality which, contrary to general opinion, was rather narrow and exclusive. Three of his closest political friends—Stepniak early in his career, and Nettlau and Malatesta after his death—pointed out that he was rigid in his views and dogmatic in his expression of them. As the leading figure in the anarchist movement, moreover, what he said was scarcely challenged until his attitude to the First World War went too far for all but his most faithful followers. This is indeed an illuminating case, since Kropotkin's support for the Allies in 1914 actually followed a strand in his thought going back over forty years—from seeing the communes of the Slav and Latin peoples as the nucleus of a libertarian order and Wilhelmine-cum-Marxist Germany as the support of the authoritarian order, to seeing a war between France and Germany as a revolutionary rather than national struggle—which most anarchists preferred to ignore until it forced itself on their attention.

This bears on Kropotkin's attitude to violence in general which, again contrary to general opinion, was one of approval. From beginning to end he insisted on the necessity for a violent insurrection to destroy the existing system. Though he opposed gratuitous assassination and indiscriminate terrorism, he favoured individual propaganda by deed, with the proviso that it must be supported by mass direct action; and he found the best hope for such action in the organised labour movement, especially the revolutionary syndicalism at the turn of the century which tried to bring insurrection through the general strike.


Thus the sort image of Kropotkin, which was projected by himself as well as by his respectable admirers, is soon dispelled by a closer look at his writings, and particularly the shorter writings in which he laid greater emphasis on such traditional anarchist topics as mutual struggle rather than mutual aid, social revolution rather than social evolution. More significant than the better-known books already mentioned are the earlier collections of agitational articles—*La Conquête du Pain* (1892), which was translated some time later as *The Conquest of Bread* (1906), and *Paroles d'un Révolté* (1885), which has still not been fully translated—and the many later uncollected articles of the same kind. It is in this frankly propagandist work that Kropotkin's most characteristic doctrines are expounded: above all those of anarchist communism as the end—that the whole of society should be organised on the basis of common ownership and popular control at grass roots—and of revolutionary expropriation as the means—that this must be accomplished by the forcible seizure by the mass of the people of all capital and property. His political doctrines may be summed up in the phrase used for the Russian edition of *La Conquête du Pain*, and also for the group formed by his Russian followers and the paper they published—a phrase still heard in the Communist world: 'Bread and Liberty'.

But if Kropotkin is to be taken seriously, his work must be made properly available. Shall we have to wait for another half-century to be able to read him in full and in context?

N.W.



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